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Brazil's Second Notional Development Plon (1975 - 1979), I! NDP for 
short, vas published in September of 1974 as the basic programme for the 
government which came into office in March 1974. 
One of the central elements of the strategy proposed in the plan was 
the decision to maintain a rapid expansion of the gross domestic product 
projected to grow at 10 percent per year between 1974 ond 1979, despite 
the quadrupling of the oil prices in 1973/74 and the fact that the industrial 
sector in Brazil was working ot full capacity, with some branches showing 
signs of overheating. In order to sustain such a high rate of economic growth 
while maintaining external equilibrium, the I! NDP emphasised the need to 
change the structure of the economy. ’ 
The preservation of rapid economic growth under deteriorating 
international conditions meant that the underlying external adjustment 
proposed in the I] NDP was based on 6 medium or long-run strategy. In the 
first few years, current account deficits were expected to teke place, and 
as result, the net foreign debt would rise. The counterpart of these deficits 
vould be on inflow of foreign capital (both in the form of loans and direct 
investment) which would be used to finance the investment necessary to 
implement the desired change fn the structure of the economy. This change 
would be designed to raise exports and reduce imports‘”) so ns to generate in 
the medium or long-term sufficient foreign exchange to service the debt and 
perhaps, eventually, to eliminate it. — 
In point of fact, helped by favourable changes in the terms of trade, 
the current account deficits showed a downward trend between 1974 end 
1977. Borrowing in excess of what wes required to finance the current 
account deficits in the 1976/78 period led to a rise in Brazil's international 
reserves, which reached the impressive figure of US$12 billion (10°) by the
lack of confidence in Brazil's growth- 
the net foreign debt (excluding intern 
billion at the end of 1973 to us$32 bi 
Cum-debt Strategy. On the other hand, 
ational reserves) increased from US$6 
Nion at the snd of 1978, However, the second round of Sherp rise in interest rates end the 
In view of these facts, the 
Srowth-cum-debt Strategy, as q way 
the Sconomu after the first of| sh Indeed, the Il NDP strategy has time 
recession, From 
t Plan was born, 
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-(2) djustment era™’. beginning of the a  yore 
On the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the we ery in 
coup, Roberto Campos added: 
“we have made timid and inadequate adjustment to the 
first oi! crisis, with too ambitious Frias 
sectors (nuclear energy, steel, etc) ond without the s a 
of domestic savings while the morbid presence of the 
< refusal to adjust which was made possible by ii 
easy access to the eurodollor market is at the al of the 
collapse of our dreem of becoming a large power). ape es 
This view, though on extreme one, has been quite influen i. i 
ssed in Brazilion newspapers in a variety of forms”, It w 
Fi a, re in o series of two articles for The Times on how Brazil also put fo C 
ent the foreign loans that left it deep in debt: sp 
“Trying to do too much, too quickly, in the years before 
the second oil price rise, led Brazil into its present financial - 8 
difficulties), 
E F THE PAP 
The principal sim of this paper is to discuss the nai 
ut in the 1] NDP and adopted in Brazil between 1974 and ; 
strategy set 0 king the external adjustment of the economy. The period of 
ceca a is extended until 1982 in unter to examine same of the 
effects of the investment decisions made between 1974 and 1979. 
It is argued that, despite the mistakes made by the authorities in
» © positive 
&ccounts in addition to Sustainj 
negative aspects of the I NDP strategy. 
NC must be stressed that this paper “88 not have the purpose of 
«5 = 
all other possible alternatives.
“growth in Brazil could be 
led-boom which took advantage of an 
pacity in industry in the mid-60's3). less, investment in fixed 
of GNP in 1968 to 24.1 in 1970 and 26.0% in.1973(4) However, one essential feat ure of rapid economic expansion in Brazil in this period was the exceptio nally favourable international condition ——which allowed ¢ very Sharp rise in Brazil's capacity to import’), World imports (in US ‘dolla 
and 1973 compared to 7.1% j 
(goods-fob-in US$) responded t 
“ise per annum between 1967 
since 195315). 
rs) increased 17.5% Per year between 1967 
n the 1953/1973 Period. Brazil's exports 
0 this upsurge in world trade with o 246% 
and 1973, after having been almost stagnant 
The fact that the volume (quantity index) of Brazil's exports more than doubled between 1967 and 1973 cou 
Capital picked up very rapidly from 21.4% 
-7 - 
exports. As © consequence, the shere of menufactures In total ee 2 
US$) went up from 20.7% in 1967 to 31.3% in 1973. Exports ea agriculture 
products olso diversified with coffee loosing its relative Teas es 
other export crops such os soybeans experlenced a very sharp rise’. 
This most vigorous and continuous rise in export anne not 
witnessed in Brazil since the 1920's), helped to sustain en extraordinary 
increese in imports. The volume of imports (quantity index) rose 18.5% 
between 1967 and 1973 while imports of goods in US dollars increased at 
the staggering rate of 27.5% per annum betwen these two years. The import 
coefficient (imports of goods and services over GNP) went up from 5.62 in 
1967 to 9.6% in 1973 os total imports of goods and services soared from 
US$2153 millions in 1967 to US$ 685? millions in 1973. 
As a result of imports being greater than exports, there were 
continuous and, since 1969, rising current eccount deficits from 1967 to 
1973. This was meade possible by the extraordinary ae of the 
international copite! market"! which not only supplied Brozil via the 
necessary financing for the current account deficits, but allowed Brazil to 
increase its international reserves from 10% of total imports in 1968 to 
1428 of total imports in 19731), Consequently, the gross foreign debt rose 
from US$3780 millions at the end of 1966 to US$12571.5 millions at the 
" end of 1973, but the net fereign debt (gross foreign debt less international 
reserves) increased much more modestly from U5$3523 millions to 
2) US$6156.5 millions between these two years(!2), 
It is perhaps importent to stress at this point the euphorie which was 
generated in some quarters of the society by the so-called ‘economic 
iracle’. Government propagenda seemed to have reflected as well as m ‘ 
reinforced the belief of some groups (particularly among military men, 
government circles, entrepreneurs ond middle class groups) that Brazil wes 
rapidly becoming a world power. Economic success was likely to have been
Procesg(!5), 
Furthermore, Since the j 
Of capacity by 1972/73, to m 
merginol propensity 4 ation. That, in tum, would tend to raise the 
Yy to import Capital goods above its average propensity. In 
h-rate of 22.7% of the domestic capital goods 
973, the volume of imports of cepitol goods 
he same period’'®). 
The refore, although Brazil's current account deficits in this Period 
fact, despite $n annual growt 
Sector hetween 1970 end 4 
Increased 24.78 per year int 
may, b : : Y. by ond large, be explained by the very high rates of economic growth 0 Upled with @ somewhat libero! approach to im ports''?) it sep ’ m Structural nature of Brazil's unbalanced 8 that the 
growth model wa becoming « major factor in the rise of imp 8 Increasingly 
orts as well ag in Making imports less elasti ¢ with respect to @ rise in their price By struct 
: Fuctural nature of 
=942 
intermediate goods sector, but also to the relatively small size of the 
capital goods sector ond of a number of essential intermediate goods 
industries. 
If the rising trend in Brazil's current account deficits in 1969/73 
was already an indication that « sizeable current account deficit was to be 
expected in 1974, even if the terms of trade was to remain constant at the 
rather favourable level of 1970, assuming no change in policy end in the 
growth pattern of the economy, the first oil shock drastically eggravated 
that prospect. 
’ As a result of a rising use of oil per unit of output and of on almost 
. . stagnant domestic production of oil, imports of crude oil over domestic 
consumption (ignoring stock changes) increased from 61% in 1968 to B08 in 
1973. New discoveries of oi! in Brazil were roughly equal to the amount 
extracted so that the level of known oil reserves remained nearly constant 
from 1968 to 1971, showing o declining tendency thereafter. In point of 
fact, because oi] production from the known oi! reserves onshore wes 
falling and bound to continue to fall due to exhaustion, and bearing in mind 
the inevitable log between oil discovery and production, the short run 
- prospects of the domestic oil supply in Brazil were not good at oll, even 
after the offshore oil reserves became known in 1974. 
What the analysis in this section suggests is that by 1974 Brazil's 
imports had become quite price inelastic in the short run and, given that 
the first oil shock led to both @ drastic contraction in the economic 
exponsion of the advanced economies and a fail in the volume of world trade, 
it would have been extremely difficult for Brazil to have significantly 
increased the rate of growth of the volume of exports, even if domestic 
absorption in Brazil was also to fall sharply. As demend in the advanced 
economies was declining competition for external morkels must have been 
substantially intensified.
-11- 
{2) The IL NDP Strategy 
(2.1) Economic Growth, Accumulation, Domestic and Foreign Savings 
Central to the II NDP strategy wos the decision to maintain a rapid 
expansion of the gross domestic product, projected to grow at 10 percent 
per year between 1974 ond 1979. Nevertheless, the Il NDP recognised the 
difficulties, under the circunstonces, in sustaining such a high rate of 
economic growth: 
‘The government is aware of the difficulty of 
maintaining rates of growth of the order of 10 percent from 
1975 onwards, mainly in view of the fact that the industrial 
sector has reached full utilization of capacity and due to the 
problems related to the energy crisis, the shortage of raw 
materials and their effects on the balonce of payments. 
Consequently, it will be necessary to keep o flexible 
attitude, assessing year by yeer the results achieved in 
order to make the proper adjustments. Nevertheless, the 
option of sustaining o high rote of growth was teken es a . 
basic policy, since for a country which is still building up 
its entrepreneurship and industrial structure, a set back 
could mean a violent shock for its managerial organization 
ond for the viability of its national development™”), 
In order to sustain such o high rate of economic growth, while 
maintaining external equilibrium, the 1 NDP emphasised the need to change 
the structure of the economy. 
“It is undeniable that from now on to grow at 10 percent 
with the same supply and demand structure of the previous 
phase would be difficult and not very rational. The reasons
-12-— 
wes th at which Permitted the resumption of e conomic 
Growth dospitethetalirieuitieisiated tothe impo rtation of 
bstitution 
and skilleg 
Capital goods. Furthermore, the present import su 
strategy requires inputs, Particularly technology 
labour, » Whose internal Supply 13 inelastic in th medium term), 
nn 
It should be stre ssed that the Criticisms of Abreu and Malan f on focussed 
-13- 
on the inconsistency between the very high growth rote terget and what 
they rightly saw es the necessary sdjustment in the supply end demend 
structures of the economy, 
In order to echieve o 10 percent annual growth rate in the 1974/79 
period, the I! NDP estimated that the gross fixed capital formation would 
also grow ot 10 percent per year, thus remaining constant ot roughly 25 
percent of total GDP. , j 
Teble (2.1.1) shows the breek down of planned growth rates by 
sectors. Note that, according to the I] NDP, economic growth would continue 
to be led by the industriel sector and, in particular, by manufacturing 
industry and thot the rates of growth in these sectors would be only stightiy 
below those achieved in the 1970/1974 period, which had benefited from 
both the favourable international conditions and the rise in the utilization 
of capacity. Growth in agriculture was projected to be slightly faster, while 
in the service sector it was to be slightly slower than it had been in the 
previous five years. 
It can also be observed thet the rates of growth actually achieved in 
the 1974/79 period were well below the target rates. Nonetheless, it should 
be emphasised that the actuol rates of growth remained close to their 
historical average rates for Brazil since World War II end were considerably 
higher than the rates of economic exponsion in the world economy in this 
period®), 
It must also be stressed that the share of the gross fixed capital 
formation in GDP wes well over the 11 NDP terget - see last row in table 
(2.1.1). This is a clear evidence of the tremendous investment effort made in 
this period. Moreover, the rete of domestic savings rose from 22.6 percent 
in 1965/66 to 23.4 percent in 1967/73 and to 25.3 percent in the 1974/79 
period), This is in sharp contrast with the views expressed by Campos 
(quoted earlier in this paper) and by Furtedo'!©),
-13a- 
Table (2.1.1): 1] jecti i NDP Proj ctions and Actual Results for the Rates of 
OWL h by Sectors and Investment Share in total GDP 
(in percentage) 
/__1970/7 : 2 
“ Actual Figures Ul san 
~Annual(Compound) NDP Projections Actual Figures 
Rates of Growth 
GDP 
hax: 11.6 10.0 
Industrial Output 126 : 6.4 
Manufac. Industry . 12.7 12.0 ) 7 
Agriculture 67 me 6.7 
6.9 Services 12.90) say 43 
“Share of the Gross 25,312) 0710.0 6.31) 
Fixed Capital For mation ant 27.9 
in GDP (at 1975 Prices) 
NOTES : (1) Com puted : as the rate of 8rowth of the difference between total output and ou i put of the ndustrial and agricultural sect ctors; (2) Excluding 1974, 
SOURCES : II NDP and Contas Nacionais do Brasil, IBRE/FGV, 1984 
-14- 
(2.2) Allocation of Investment Resources 
The 1] NDP investment strategy may be said to have been based on 
three major priority areas: (i) import substitution in the cepital goods 
industry ond in the basic input sector; (ii) import substitution in energy; and 
(iii) infra-structure development in transportation, communicetions end 
other sectors. A cursory exomination of teble (2.2.1) can provide some idea 
about the planned investment effort in these areas. 
The share of investment in the basic industries (which comprise both 
the capital goods industries and the basic input industries) would be, 
according to the I NDP, significantly increased compared to its average in 
1970/74), with large rises in the metol working industry and chemicsis. 
The plonned rise in the ‘share of investment in these industries is eye
n more 
impressive when it is realized that there had already been a tremendous 
increase in this shore between 1970 end 1974, perticularly in the metal 
working industry, mechanical engineering, electricals and chemicals. 
The share of investment in both oil and electricity were literally 
expected to double. As fer as investment in transportation is concerned, 
there was to be a reallocation of investment resources from highways to 
" railways and shipping”. The shore of investment in communications would 
also rise significantly. 
Therefore, underlying this strategy there were two major aims: (i) to 
increase the capacity of production of tradeabies (with emphasis on both 
intermediate goods, including energy resources”, end capital goods); and 
(ii) to change the demand structure of the economy towards higher 
_consumption of electricity. This would be done through the realiccation of 
resources towards industries which were intensive in consumption of 
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, estimated to rise from US 
-15- 
through a programme of electrification of the existing rail
ways, the use of 
electricity in the new railway and underground
 projects and the 
electrification of the rural areas“. In fact, the importence 
of 
hydroelectricity os 4 substitute for imported sourc
es of energy permits us 
to treat electricity os a tradeable good in the 
Brazilian context. 
Now, when we look at the actual results achieved i
n 1975/79 in table 
(2.2.1), it is clear that they tended to be below the 
1! NDP projections), 
except in railways and highvrays. However, it should be n
oted that in all 
sectors in which the shore of investment was expec
ted to increase, ond 
therefore should be considered the 1! NDP priorities, did
 so, except in the 
transport equipment industry and in chemicals, though e
ven in these * 
industries the shares of investment were kept above the 
levels observed in 
1970), 
Therefore, it could be said that not only the 
overall rate of 
pected but that the desired direction of 
the 
fully achieved. 
accumulation was higher than ex 
reallocation of resources vas, by and la
rge, success 
(2.3) The Balance of Payments 
On the external front, exports of goods 
(in nominel US dollars) were 
$ 6 billion (10°) in 1974 to US$ 20 
billion in 1979, 
thus increasing at 20% per yeor'!?,while imports 
of goods would rise at o 
rate “slightly less than that~”) in the seme peri
od. 
current account deficit in 1974 wes slready 
orked out, the implication of the 
Given that a large 
predictable at the time the II NDP was 
W 
ected rates of growth of exports and imports we
s an accumuloted 
cit of over US$ 30 billion in the period between 1974 
proj 
_ current account defi 
and 1979), However, as Abreu and Malen pointed out, the {1 NDP did not 
give 
any hint as to how such lerge current account deficits would be finenced vie
frest to maintain the 
system in crisis or t 0 3 Permanently. the advance 
va 
d economies or to f rust: underdeveloped countries 
Pe 
» Whic 
the international community 
Countries) would also have to 
h moke up the majority of 
Since they (the oij exporting 
bear the consequences-(6). 
necessity of access b developing Countries to the fi 
sates tlhe 
nancial Centres of Euro States in order to finance those pe and the United 
countries commercial deficits’”), Finally, the I! Nop stat &d Some guidelines for the current account deficits ang foreign indebtedne s3(6). 
{i) the former would be limited to « maximum of 20% of the gross Capital formation (9). 
-17- 
(2.4) The Institutional Instruments of the Strategy 
The I! NDP stressed its commitment to what it called “a modern 
model of market economy” in which “the strategy of development {s actively 
conducted by the government%"). In fact, the II NDP pledged to be aiming at 
“an equilibrium” between the participation of the state and of the private 
sector in the economy ond between national and foreign enterprises within 
the private sector!2), 
However, despite the political lobbies against the state intervention 
in the economy, the I] NOP made clear the areas in which responsibility 
- would fall with the government. 
“In addition to being responsible for the strategy and 
public functions such as security, justice, etc., the 
government considers the following its own arees of ection: 
(i)Infra-structure sectors such as energy, trensportation 
and communications. The production of equipment and 
materials for ‘these sectors is, nonetheless, the 
responsibility of the private sector; (ii)The areas of social 
development (often in conjunction with the private sector) 
such os education, health and social services (housing is a 
special case since contracting is the private sector’s. 
responsibility), 
Bearing in mind the importance of the projected shore of the 
investments in infra-structure in the total gross fixed cepital formation 
and the very relevant part which the government was expected to play as a 
direct producer, especially in mining and in the steel industry, and in the 
financing of enterprises in the capital goods sector and in the basic input 
industries, it seems clear that, the authorities rhetoric notwithstanding, . 
no reduction in the state intervention was envisaged by the 11 NDP.
of contro! of the market and from the absorption of Competitors~6) 
The 11 NDP Strategy also aimed ot diversifying the origin of foreign 
the use of economic instruments - incentives and disi 
and fiscal - with no use of restrictive legislation ond the rules would be maintoined), Stebility of the 
A * regords the results ectualty achieved the existing evidence) Suggest 9°Sts thot indeed the share of government Investment (including those of se 0 
-19- 
state-owned enterprises) in the total gross fixed capital formation tended 
to increase in the 1974/79 period. As to the participation of the national 
private entrepreneurship in the economy, to the best of my knowledge, no 
clear-cut evidence has yet been produced. 
The institutional instruments of the Il NDP strategy came under 
attock in Lessa’s ex-post analysis of the 1974/1976 period’), Lessa’s main 
critical point seems to have been the supposed “failure of the authoriterian 
regime to alter the pattern of industrialization in Brazil“! which was one 
of the main goals of the !! NDP.He argued that the state-owned enterprises, 
chosen to be the central agents of the I! NDP, could not “for structural 
reasons, in the downturn of en economic cycle, carry out the strategy!) 
Deleys in some investment projects, the government incapacity to 
sustain the projected high levels of aggregate demand and the political 
friction between the state and some Brazilian entrepreneurs (particularly 
from the capitol goods sector) were pointed out by Lessa as evidence of the 
‘collapse’ of the II NDP strategy!!2), 
Lessao’s central criticism is rather misleading. It is undeniable that 
the military regime was suthoritarion. It is beyond any doubt that a major 
change in the structure of the economy (or in the pattern of 
industrialization) would inevitably generate political friction among the 
"different interests from different sectors of the economy, especially at o 
time when economic growth was slowing down. However, there seems te be 
no reasoning behind the idea that the state-owned enterprises, becouse of 
their own nature, could not carry out the strategy. In fact, given the 
circunstances, they were quite successful in sustaining what, by all 
standards, should be considered very high rates of economic growth 
_ (probably even too high rates), as well as in making fundamental changes in 
the structure of the economy, as will be demonstrated in this paper.
’ 
-20a- -20- 
Table (3.1.1): II NDP Projections for the Capital Goods Industry (3) The Capital Soods Sector an Basi 8 | 
Planned Output = Annual 





I NDP strategy made clear its two main priority areas: the energy sector 
1974 = 1979 ie 
; 
11.2 
and the basic sector, Comprising the capitat goods Sector and the basic input 




phat ee A 
MechEng.&ElecEquip.(i0tonnes) 898 1603 me 
The adjustment in the economic structure of Brazil 
Tractors (1000 unities) ' 4 84 13.8 
which is necessary in view of the oi| Crisis and the new 
Shipbuilding (1000 DWT) 410 1140 22.7 
. Stage of its industria} development implies in great 
‘ Railway Equipment (10? tonnes) 122 214 11.9 
emphasis to the Basic Industries, especially the copite! 
"SOURCE: 11 NDP. 
goods sector and heavy eletronics as wel! as the Basic Input Industries, in order to Substitute imports and . If possible, open up new exports*2). Table (3.1.2) Capital Goods - Domestic Production of Transport Equipments 
In the next section the energy sector will be exomined. The next two subsections deal with the impact of the i Year Ships Locomo- Train Aiplanes Tractors Lorries Buses investment projects on the . oo structures of production ond demend of the Capital goods sector and the 
Ss 68iwniy Gini (unity) (unity) cunt) CGany stony) 
“0 
| 1970 120.6 11 1808 52 16707 . 38388 4058 
o 197} 188.3 60 1935 61 25448 38868 4393 
(3.1) The Capital Goods Sector 
1972 3136 36 £9962. GT iri BAAD: 499557, S230 
1973 260.5 56 3406. 111 44211 69202 6362 
1974 320.4 77 3576 = 105 52741 79413 8262 
1975 466.2 107 5025 279 65666 78688 10126 
its terget. The 1976 700.5 106 4479515 71713-83891 12059 
& tremendous 1977, 511.6 110 2538 550 59419 101338 13828 
j 1978 601.0 42 3053 221 55874 = 86269 14340 
bie 1979 14015 47 2513-279 64511 93051 12832 
SOURCES: Conjuntura Econdmica, FIBGE, Anuario Estatistico dos Transportes 
and Estudos Especiais N2 1 IBRE-FGY, 1979. 
Table (3.1.1) gtves the targets which were set for this sector by the 
WONDP. Teble (3.1.2) brings out the actual results for the domestic 
Production of capital goods in the transport equipment industry. It can be observed that the production of ships in 1979 surpassed 
production of all other transport equipment underwent 
expansion until about 1976/77, Suggesting that thei 
Production were likely to have reached levels ye 
Output, however, has tended to decline since then ag O result of a fall in demend. ,
-21-— io -21a- 
The im Rela Port substitution ond export promotion efforts in these 


























in, te 5 BawooS Shipbuilding industry g ae railway equipment industry and the s O not s 
a coefficients how « clear trend as regards their import 
£8 manne 
z 
az 3 oo When the cq a ’ Pital goog 
Teng 
Order” nd those oN goods ste '8 brokendown into machines ‘made on ZEE  engenn 
N Serigg* (1) : € 3 om © sleep rise in th in table (3.1.4), again it can be observed Se © export Coefficient ag 
Lal goods "made on oO 8, Ond the fact 
between 1973 ang nha this Coefficient remained roughly constant 
nie ee » Fspite the extremely high rates of accumulation 
} marked {m throughout the 1970's, Import s an a A a prottaph 
u Series’ is not 50 evident. 
8. The sharp fall in the import 
Tder in the 1969/73 end 1976/79 






































































f well b 
Therefore, the above SIs of the early 1970's, ; Stati Copital goods sector jn sin Stics Consistently demonstrate that the 






















































































































































































































































































































































































"and ‘in Series’ 
(in ee Total ‘in series’ Capital Goods Export 
1 y 
ital Goods ‘in serie ’ 
‘ 
cont 
Capital oi ‘on a a sie 
Export 
Wise aie Coefficien! 






















































SOURCES: cas bei 1 8 Exports, ae de Ma ‘SnuFaturados Yo Brasil, FGV/Banco Mun 
( ‘HAS ang 11.20) an, and Cac) CEX. Tabla (3.3 5): Rates Of Grow wth of 
Year 
F Output, Exp orts a ne lmport ond Export Coefficients 
of the Capital Googe Indus Ustry (in centages) - 
se on quantity indoxes -~ base year = 1970) 











































































NOTES: (1) Domestic Outbut in 1979 gc cor 1981) oF Malan ang Bonelli (1976); 
(2) Exports and imports jn 1970 ca) sty fi value 85 In US$ Fog 08 by using the average 
Skchange Tate (say Pricg 
por 
chase Price for ®xports) 
SOURCES Conjuntura Ec 
Shelli ang Rat (19 
e Central B id Fi 
-22- 
th of output were d, although the actual rates of ; ine thon the retes 
industry 1s concerned, wareabill very Mair er tic output of both 
not os high as plonned, ms period). Actual aware: of production 
observed in the a outmatched the _ metal only), on the 
aluminium and zinc a Production of copper ae wos 63 thousand 
projected for that year?). until 1982 but output bi rojected in the I! NDP 
other hand, did not ba the capacity of production p 
onnes, thus greater 
etic elastomers 
1979. 
ducts, but sulphuric acid, a ae Pada For all the other pro (becrntes of output er In point of fact, 
ond ammonia, the a in Ae copacity of ie the copecity of 
Projected by the 11 NDP = included simply =e output), but the 
synthetic elastomers oe wir eslnat et ne only 6% below the 
Production in 1974 was inly achieved since outpu e noted that both for 
terget for 1979 was ae eor. It should also b her than the projected 
cepacity planned for a al ine 108 BD | 
the 
ilizers ond paper ac 
steel on 
cl iiieaaiatel oa a domestic sea F teble (3.2.2). 
The impact of the i of this industry ts ene ig: 
import and Rapa’ coneyicten henomenal. The ae 1974, dropped then 
Indeed, this impact is quite i 1% in 1970 to 39.3% ae The figures for 
Steel, having increased sn 1979 and only 1.0% in if 7.3% in 1979 and 
“ontinuously to reach 3.5% Lai in 1970, 53.8% in a Patna tbo 
flat rolled products were i exports of steel Be from then onwerds, 
only 0.9% in 1963. Althoug roduction until 1976/7 : the aorly eighties; 
relatively to the domestic -” rotes of growth and, domestic output. 
“xPorts experienced phenome uite substantial on ae in ferroalloys and 
they already accounted for a q ffect and the export 6 ificant falls in the 
The import Siler . (3.2.3). Note thot sign! 
refractories ore shown in to
Table (3.2.1); Basic Input Industries — 1] NDP Projections and Actual Figures 





flat-rolled steel (1) 





















































































NOTES: (1) Including heavy shapes; (2) Including special steel; (3) Primary metal only, 
SOURCES: II NDP, Anuario Estatistico do Brasil - FIBGE, Consider, Abiquim, Superintendéncla da Borracha, Associacdo Br. de Prod. de Fibras Artificials 
e Sintéticas, Banco do Brasil and Industrial Surveys — FIBGE 











































Growth Import Export Rate of 
Exports Coefficient Coefficient Domestic 
Output 
Az 15.5 8.4 aa 
-56.3 20.6 31 38 
247.8 17.9 9.4 9.9 
-50.4 30.6 43 ° 17.6 
-73.9 93.5 1.2 8.3 
38.7 33.9 14 4.2 
-14.0 17.7 1 9.1 
59.5 11.9 03 1.2 
893.3 6.7 29 16.4 
198.7 4.4 74 9.9 
67.2 44 10.8 3.8 
4.0 7.6 13.6 -5.4 
81.7 3.90 22.8 -6.4 
114.1 09 415 05 


































SOURCE : Anuérlo Estatfstico do Brasil -FIBGE , several issues, and Consider. 
Steel__._._£™/ /___Non- Flat Rolled Steel f_ 



























Rolled Steel... _/ 
Import Export Export Rate of = Growth 
Exports Coefficient Coefficient 
Output 
18.4 atta a 14.1 13.9 
41 13.1 -70.6 16.0 3.6 
63 12.2 142.1 17.7" 78 
3.4 12,7 44,2 22.3 3.9 
3.0 2.3 ~41.4 39.1 2.2 
13 9.9 -33.8 24.2 13 
2.6 97 55.6 12,7 19 
5.1 15.6 58.6 87 26 
8.1 15.1 139,2 57 5.4 
8.1 14.1 63.3 3.4 Ve 
493 9.6 16.0 3.4 8.2 
14.2 "12.4 49.0 6.0 13.9 ° 
14.6 13 40.2 2.4 19.2 







Table (323) : Ferroalloys and Refractories (in Percentages) 




= 62 177 1971 37.1 18.9 20.0 1972 10.7 88 312 
1973 
22.7 5.1 26.0 
1974 
278 75 20.1 
1975 
73 29 237 
1976 
19.9 09 283 
1977 
195 6.1 31.0 
1978 
10.2 12 365 
1979 
18.4 03 34.1 
1980 
127 0.6 30.4 
198] 
25 2.0 45.6 
1992 
0.0 0.4 40.7 
. 1983 
36 02 60.4 
NOTE : Baseg on wolumes in tonnas CE : CONS) DER _ hic 
Table (3.2.4) - Non-Ferrous Metals (in Percentages) 
é a Aluminium Rate of Import Export Growth of Coerr. Coerr, Domestic 
Output 1974 a 50.4 1.6 
* 1975 14.8 40.1 1s 1976 15.9 36.0 V4 1977 20.9 36.9 15 1978 73 263 2.0 1979 33.7 23,0 3.4 1980 69 18.8 4.0 1981 5.9 12.0 8.2 
* 1982 16.1 4.4 6.4 1963 28.5 23 40.0 — 
Silicon 
Year 




















NOTES - Including prj SOURCE : CONSIDER 






































    
/___ Refractories — 
Rate of — Import coer 
Growth of Coeff. 
Domestic 
Output: 5 
- 25:3 a 
11.8 Ae 59 
47 ae 
“8.1 6.1 an 
62 48 a4 
15.8 63 129 
pe a 17.6 -23.6 149 223 
-23.6 10.1 17.1 
“71 5.1 
/ 
(————= iN Export Rate of Import Coat. 
Growth of — Coaff. 
Domestic 
tput 
ei 642—— oe 
10.6 56.3 01 
33.7 50.7 02 
5.7 51.3 01 
22.6 49.7 02 
15.4 43.3 03 
21.8 40,1 106 
15.4 21.7 23 
-0.4 wt 19 
05 3. 
4. Tin oan 
Rate of Import Caaf 
Growth of  Coaff. 
Domestic 
Output as 422 
27 12 a 
“15 06 339 
19.7 ae 5 
21.1 ! 9 
89 03 a ss 
“13.2 0.7 B34 
-11.4 04 475 




ile the export ort coefficients con be observed mee ae ae reveal o quite = ee i ere 'conwarnea’ Tanta a. As for as the main anise import substitution effects la. 
provides 0 clear picture. aad industries. In aol! these three se 3 is 
the aluminium, zine and ‘ upon imports in 1974, Since the early vai Brazil was highly oa zinc, and since 1977, in the case of sil the case of aluminium ‘an self-sufficient in these metals and a Brazil has Vand ntial shares of its domestic fet = 
managed to place subs i in the case of aluminium ond silicon). - oe ne at t remained roughly constant at oround pes a 
i ae ae of primary copper by Caraiba Metais Ades a dhantte scr An down to 40%. Exports of tin fell in 1 aol 
breueine "hie Rie ac production, but showed a pronounced anne: a ed de tin remeined negligible Saroughout ‘the 1 
thereafter. Impo 
. 
mr ble (3.2.5) brings out the fect that Brazil hes 7 ra ai ° i 
f caustic soda in 
ale pea enn 
es i the early 1980's. = a 
7 eetaanin in the import coefficients of fertilizers 
shows the dras 
eS erges from table (3.2.6), which examines és a Li iy is also one in which the retio of ii . 
performance of petroc ih (imports of basic products, intermedia consumption folis i. resins ond synthetic fibers have oll bests products, ea 1980's) and the shares of exports in the domestic 
acon een especially after 1927/78. . , ae ee has also been very importent in the poper an 
Import su 
i eint Gi fact,
Table (3.2.5) ; Caustic Soda and Fertilizers (In percentages) 
Caustic Soda fs er flizers (2) 
  
4. 
/——_Nitrogen Base___-/ /__Phosphate Base___/ 
Year Rate of Import Rate of Import Rate of Import 
Growth of Coeff. Growth of Coeff. Growth of Coeff. 
Domestic ; Domestic _ Domestic 
Output Output Output 
1970 tis 52.7 Rei 92.8 me 59.4 
1971 . Sd 52.6 245.0 75.2 8 .. 54,7 
1972 ‘ 27.1 46.9 275 78.6 19.3 66.9 
1973 14.2 46.7 29.5 67.1 14.8 58.6 
1974 ~4.9 53.1 26.3 63.1 : 16.2 57.7 
1975 12.6 8.0 11.8 60.3 32.8 49.3 
1976 7.0 42.1 24.2 58.4 70.2 31.9 
1977 35.5 32.4 15.5 66.3 — 24.8 30.4 
1978 64.4 65 14,7 62.3 3.8 26.0 
1979 11.8 29 68 63.7 10.3 25.8 
1980 TA 17 35.3 o7.7 26.4 20.8 
1981 98 18 " -89 478 27.2 12.8 
1982 © 0.1 01 13.8 33.4 4.8 36 
NOTES : (1) Based on volumes in tonnes; (2) Based on volunes in tonnes of nutrients 
SOURCE : Anudrio Estatistico do Brasil - FIBGE, several years. 
Table (3,2.6) : Petrochemicals (in percentages) 
/__Basic Products__/ /Intermediate Products’ /Thermoplastic Resins_/ /__Synthetic Fibers_/ /_Synthetic Elastomers 
MW) (2) (3) 
Year Rateof Import Export Rate of Import Export Rate of Import Export Rate of Import Export Rate of Import Export 
coeff. coeff. growth coeff. coeff. growth coeff. coeff. growth coeff. coeff. growth coeff. coeff. growth 
domestic domestic domestic domestic domestic 
output output output output output 
1970 se 31.0 0.0 i 1.9 0.2 ae 47.0 0.0 we 22.4 0.0 evs 17.9 5.0 
1971 39 42.0 0.0 258 37.0 02 272 52.0 0.0 19.0 15.4 1.0 36 8626.1 0.0 
298 43.0 03 26.7 47.0 10 46 124 00 210 23.4 Os 1972 238 49.0 9.0 
1973 252.0 22.0 00 346 440 02 1007 21.0 20 238 249 04 328 29.1 07 
1974 432 140 OO 182 410 19 #53 350 20 219 216 13 235 207 07 
1975 44 70° 00 34 410 O68 95 180 20 99 93 17 -170 175 16 
1976 256 120 O00 19 490 Of 245 290 10 235 6.1 O06 276 122 06 
1977 147 100 O00 272 350 O00 66 220 10 32 59 068 145 N19 O2 
1978 70 10 OO 473 220 49 129 220 20 #125 02 22 95 137 33 
(1979 486 70 O04 316 180 36 S07 140 20 189 51 50 86 140 61 
1980 127 60 14 279 #140 #42 «201 #60 40 79 #60 48 NS 63 54 
1981 68 O4 63 986 60 146 -93 20 170 -156 50 123 -105 113 127 
1992 52 OS 28 24 60 73 126 20 1850 24 21 67 293 160 160 
1983 449 «#203 «#4123 82 20 122 205 10 300 -267 11 96 -233 160 18.1 
NOTES : (1) Including ethylene, propsne, butane, benzene, xylena and toluene 
(2) They include sixteen Intermediate products 
(3) Including polyethylene of high and low density, polystyrene, PVC, and pollpropilena. 









Therefore, as for as the basic industries are concerned, it should be 
crucial to export success, so were the investments made in the 1974/79 
Brezil has not only achieved self-sufficiency in cellulose, but 
has also been 
exporting significant shares of the domestic production of both 
paper and 
beyond any doubt that a major import substitution process has token ploce 
and that, whilst ‘adjustment’ policies in the 1980’s seem to have been 
cellulose, particularly since 1976. 
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-25a- 
-25- 
(4) The infrestructure Sectors A 355555899923 
(4.1) The Energy Sector 
The composition of Consumption of primery energy in Brezil in the . | 
B sersessess ee 
1970's end erly 1980's is displeyed tn table (4.1.1). Note thot in 1973 
: 
petroleum accounted for 42.6% of the total Consumption of primary energy 
AeRaRRaRReee 
'n Brazil, Although this wes not ¢ very high share by world stenderds, 
o_— 
domestic Production of petroteu: 
| 
m in 1973 supplied only 20% of total consumption, making Brezij Quite E its dependent on petroleum imports to satisfy Z preteen egy ene a neess. The quadrupling of oil prices in 1973/74 had o dramatic . mpac . 
=< 
tn , on Brazil's current Sccount position as imports of crude oil jumped 
Ss . “SE Of total imports of goods (fob) in 1973 to 20.28 of tote! imports go AaSNaRasaRaS of Seods (fab) in 1974, 
2 The WW NDP = 3 at regarded the Snergy sector es crucial for the success of its oS 2 annonenaanns rategy: . 
3 3 SSoSs009CO--- . s &@ it 
3 
seen Would hot be vieble to grow rapidiy without 
e 8 Cleratin, 
= = neces 9 the Sxpension of energy supply. Hence, it 18 Ss § SeSSSssssse2 a: 
3 TY to reduce the dependence of the energy sector on 
e 2 Petroleum replacing 4 S 2 for coal Ag it by electricity, os fer as possible, and g 2 ol which ig ’ 
ANBOMROANAYH -importeg(t) Abundent in the market though partly E g 8 SSRR eSnse
. 
t $ As it was seen { . = o£ n se 
- SUrtegy envisaged @ me . ‘Yon (2.2) table (2.2.1) of this peper, the I NOP ' § g S8!ve programme of j oration | a 3 WOANKR-BOKAAnw tnd prog nvestments in off explo BE -£ edavdedeoren treme me in electricity Generating (basically hydroelectricity), é 2 NN SETS TRb8s 
ond distribution, Th, 
= ® Blen algo mention velopment of = the shale programme, the 2d the develor | S § MRERLESSssgR end an incren: Production of atcohos to be mixed with gasoline, 2 BAARARAARRARK Tease in the use Of coal jn indust; 
& The substi v tution of Slectricity f 
mme of Slectrification of the existing raitwoys, the use of 




















electricity in the new railway end underground projects ond the 
electrification of the rural oreos”). The tremendous expansion projected for 
the intensive electricity consuming industries such es the metal working, 
chemical, paper and cellulose industries would also tend to raise the share 
of electricity in total energy consumption). 
Us oa use of hydroelectricity for industrial purposes wos 
ojor contribution to the impert substitution process 
and, especial 
ind P ; ly, to the export drive of the intensive electricity consuming ustries in view of the comparative advant low 
cost and large age stemming from th
e 
Potential of hydro-power in Brazit‘4), 
Table (4,1. 1) reveals that the share of petroleum in total consumption mary energy remained rou 
) Significantly since then. The 
from 19.0% in 1973 to 25.0% 
other ind 
of pri 
ghly unchanged until 1976 but has fallen very 
shore of hydroelectricity has risen steadily 
in 1979 and to 26.8% in 1983, The shares of 
ergy such as natural gas, steam cool and sugar ® also show 
n 8 pronounced upward trend. The share of firevood, on T hand, has fallen 
igenous sources of en 
cane hey 
the othe 
uite drastically though consumption in absolute nee 1979(5). 
In the next Subsections the 
emphas 
terms has risen Steadily si 
energy Sector is examined in more detail, i$ again is plac e 
don Comparing the actual results achieved with the Projections made in the 1) NDP 
(4.1.1) Petroleum 
-26a- 















Domestic Oil Production 
Onshore (1) 




























Note: (1) including liquid of natural gas 





















Table (4.1.1.2): Structure of Oil Refining and Consumption of Oil Derivatives 














    
  
 
Gasoline Fuel-Oil . Diesel 
Production consumption production consumption production consumption 
295 30.1 33.8 31.0 22.6 22.6 
26.4 28.1 335 31.0 225° 22.0 
29.6 26.7 32.8 313 235 22.5 
20.5 25.7 32.2 314 23.7 235 
24.0 23.3 32.2 32.6 25.4 24.7 
21.4 212 32.2 32.7 273 26.0 
20.8 19.6 318 32.6 27.0 26.0 
18.9 18.1 30.6 31.7 26.9 265 
16.0 15.9 30.1 315 30.2 290 
16.9 16.3 28.6 27.1 29.2 30.6 
73 15.7 29.6 23.8 31.0 315 
16.0 14.1 23.1 21.9 31.6 32.7 
  































Table (4.1.1.3): Rates of growth of crude oil and oil derivatives consumption in Brazil 

























Production of of! onshore dropped continuously until 1980 when {t reached 0 
level 32.3% below the 1970 level; (11) although new discoveries were being 
made offshore, as the sharp rise in ofl reserves after 1975 demonstrate 
(compared to 1973 reserves doubled before 1952 
an inevitable lag between discove 
deep offshore wells)(2). 
- see column 5), there is 
Ty and productjon of oil (particularly in 
Note, however, thot the domestic sy pply of oil doubled between 1979 and 1983 and the daily average production by the end of 1984 was more then 
fr then the 1979 average’). it must be stressed thot the 
d2 in of! exploration in 1974/79 were absolutely essential on results achieved in 1979/64. 
three times high 
investments me 
for the Producti 
Dome 
; 
Stic production ang reserves of natural gas rose much more rapidly in this Period. Compared to the 1973 level, pro 
ge in the structure of supply occurred in the - As tab! 
total Production of oi] 
Of a fall in the sha Te of motor 9osoline,and 
ron 
in the share of fuel off. The 
so mine 
objective of this change wes to accomodate the ofl 
structure of Consumption of of! derivatives in Brazil 
Oil refining proti|el4) e (4.1.1.2) Shows, the shore of diesel in the derivatives and natural gas increased at the expense 
refining profile to the 
Indeed, Brazil wa Pvt by fuel ot, an from 1981 to 1983 by diesel. ’ $ *learly @ net exporter of diese! up to 1979, of fuel-oil a : fter 1980, ond of 98soline after 1976 Onsumption of Crude oi] rose 6.2% 
| 
and fel] “2.3% @nnual) 
until 1975, ang again 
ut per year between 1973 and 1979 
ro 
M1979 10 1983. As Consequence, the import 
duction wos up 87% by: 
-28- 
coefficient of crude oil increased from 80.1% in 1973 to 85.9% in 1979, 
falling thereofter to 71.63 in 1983 and to 50.0% in 1984 5), 
The observation of the fact that the domestic prices of the main oil 
derivatives in Brazil (gesoline,fuel and diesel) did not rise in line with the 
import price of crude oil, meesured in domestic currency (by using the 
actual exchange rate), after the first oi! shock, has led to the argument that 
price induced substitution possibilities were underestimated ©), and hed 
Brazil adopted o more aggressive price policy, consumption of crude oi! per 
unit of output could have been significantly reduced. Although it is very 
likely thot such on underestimation ectus!ly occurred”), it is difficult to 
, _ 988ess how important the price induced substitution could have been if a 
severe drop in economic growth end/or’o dramatic. increase in inflation 
were to be avoided. 
It should also be stressed that consumption of crude oil per unit of 
GDP, after having increased 6.9% from 1970 to 1973, was kept below the 
1973 level throughout the 1974/1979 period®, and then, in 1980/1983, it 
dropped to a level about 153 lower than that of 1973. Furthermore, table 
(4.1.1.3) shows that the ratios of growth of the main oil derivatives were 
- Severely reduced (via prices or otherwise) in the years in which they 
became determinants of the totel consumption of crude oil. Therefore, olthough it is likely that there was scope for further reductions in the 
Consumption of crude oil per unit of output, it should be recognized that 
Some short-run adjustments were made, and that further adjustments’ via 
Price would have increasingly sharpened the trade-off between price induced substitution ond inflation for given rates of growth. 
(4.1.2) Electricity 
_ As mentioned eorlier in this paper, the II NDP gave great priority to 
the production of electricity, especially hydroelectricity, as e substitute
-29- 
for imported sources of energy. According to the I] NDP, installed capacity 
of generoting electricity wes expected to increase to 28 millions of KW by 
1979 while consumption would-reach 107 biltions (10°) of KWh by the same 
year”) Both projections were Slightly below actual figures: capecity went 
up to 30 millions of KW ond consumption reeched 109 billions of KWh in 
19797). It fs interesting to note that consumption of electricity wos 
greater than expected despite the fact that economic growth was much 
low i 
er than planned, which implies that the expected substitution effect was 
octually underestimated over this period. 
eee” i Changing the de
mand structure of the economy 
figures in teble (4 : : se Of electricity con be br
oadly assessed by the 
both the corsterptts 1) Columns (1) end (2) show a treme
ndous increase in 
vonbiion of electricity per unit of GOP and in the industriel Consumption of electricity per unit of industria! output. The share of 
hydroelestricj a ity in the total 9ross production of electricity also rose from 
"1973 to 922 in 1979 and to gaz in 19835), 
Table (4, 1.2.2) shows that the-shera of electricity in the total 
consumption of ene Nergy by the industrial s nd very sharp! ector increased continuously 8 
Y from 31.8% in renee: 1973 to 38.2% in 1979 end to 45.8% in 1983. The 
Yel Oil, on the othe : rhend, fell from 30.2% in 1973 to 27.7% in 1979 and to 14.4% tn t9g3t4) ee eee 
Therefore, “th 
y in the j ; “Te Should be no doubt that as far as the demand 
for 
: 2 in ustria] secto ; 
token pI T 18 concerned a major structural change has 
ce. Furthe 





rezil®, this move towards higher 
y to have significantly contributed, 
metal working industries oe In this period, particularly in the 
industries Which ore heay 
it es ee Y¥ Consumers of electricity ond, as seen eerlier in 
on of hydroelectricity is like! 
U, to Brazit's com 
Table (4.1.2.1): Consumptton of Electricity 























































Souces: Eletrobras Annual Reports and Contas Nactonals, 
IBRE/FGV 1984 
Teble (4.1.2.2): Consumption of
 energy by 
the industrial sector 
(in percentages based on 












































this poper, were among the most dynamic tradeable sectors in 
Electricity is also important for the texti le industry. 
in the 
The share of electricity in the totel consumption of energy ng 
ificantly. 
agricultural ond residential Sectors also increased very sign tion m 
However, in these two Sectors, the rise in electricity consump 
firewood. A 
Corresponded to a fall in the relative consumption of 
discussion on the use of ene on 
rgy by the transport sector is left to secti 
(4.2). 
ption of electricity has played such an mr a 
itio Clure of the demand for energy in the Braz ; 
loser 
investments made in this sector require a ¢ 
Although the consum 
part in changing the stru 
€conomy, the 
examination ?). 
Firstly, it is important to 
electricity Senerating in the 19 
made in t 
n realize that the sharp rise in investment i 
= ns 74/79 period was largely due to decisto F : 
e 
his period but Concerning investment Projects that were design Y the projecteg rise g, in the demand for electricity in the 1980 Since these 
the 
Projects require a lengthy period of construction. Indeed, at end of 1979 the total capacit 
to satisf 
ns YJ Under construction was equal to 26 millio 
Of KW, which is equivalent to 
he almost 90% of the Capacity in operation at t 
time®). By the end of 1984, these new pro Millions of KW to the existing Capacity in 1 
jects would have added 17 
979(9). 
vestment decisions made in the 1974/79 period were largely based on 9 8 
and for electricity in the South, “West regions of Brazit was forecast until the year 
tudy in which the dem South-East and Centre 
CCepted the Projections made in the I! NDP and msde 
two Projections for th 
-31- 
t 11.4% ond 8.7% per annum, respectively, between a 
Se lation between the demand for blectrtelty 
eae fat ae on historical data, and hence, did E 
<a eee the substitution of electricity for petroleum tha initially take in 
occur. 
) ded to the ia tes of this substitution effect!!! were od oe hen estimate 
he consump 
WW ade under hypothesis II, the forecasts for t eons 
fonsom ' 
ride 1985 end 1990 were ebout 9% greater than vonne 
icity in 
the expans res - is |. Bearing this in mind, the programme for satteecd 
r hypothesis |. 
e study w: sa ity of generating electricity recommended by th ee 23 
the capac 
ing the growth o i hypothesis concerning ' 
& most optimistic 
gid take into a the final estimates of the demand for electricity 
Therefore, 
; um. Satta Mer peaae a ane aicionat electrelty far pauls hydro potentials _ It is worth noting thet, given the most economical hy sett ct 
ost o hich were considered in that study, even when the m sake w ‘ 
leer po : ded that nuc med, the study conclu 
-_ 
hypothesis was assumed, 
1wasstakon 
- become necessary only in ised". Litre be economically 
W 
f lousible projection then, no nuclear energy coul he fect that the 
more p 
the 0 tified at least before 1990. Nevertheless, in view of truction, the 
justifie : 
dy under cons ; s already i er plant (Angra 1) wa 
icel ne ai d re on the grounds of “maintaining ae sid recommende 
r station sho = this sector“’”, at least one nuclear powe nn 
activities in thi : 
existence be under construction, which. would mean the 
always be un 
0. nuclear stations in operation by 199 bitious projection of the demand for 
i the most am 
‘i 
Therefore, not even 
ration programm itu could have lent support to the nuclear coope arial c i 
nu in ’ 
ate Brazil and the Federal Republic of Germany hiram 
d between 
of nae he construction of eight nuclear power plants trusted d the co 
ing cons 
peenigts two of which (Angra Il and Angra 11!) would start being by 1990, two
-32- 
ecause 
in 1976. In fact, construction of Angra III only began in 1980, but b 
r plents ° 
of delays in Angra | due to technical difficulties, three nuclear power p 
+9(15) 
were simultaneously being constructed in Brazil in the early 1980's''9’. 
PAM iniiS7S%ew Projections were made concerning the future demond for 
electricity. It was estimated that consumption of electricity would grow at ebout 12.6% until 1985, though economic growth was then expected to maintoin 0 rate between 6 ond 7 percent per year’) Consumption of 
; 
7.4% in 
electricity would Slow down to 8.3 between 1985 and 1990 and to the 1990/95 periog, 
Economic growth in Brazil ave d raged 0.8% per annum between 1979 an 
1983, falling 3 
ion of 
“1.63 in 1981/89 ond -3.2% in 1983/82. Consumption ' 
9 an 
electricity, nonetheless, grew on average 6.7% annually between 197 
cess 
-1983. As 9 Consequence, the Sector has experienced some ex Capacity?) 
down quite 
Projected to 
to 41194 ace 
: 
wed 
ond the pace in which new Capacity wos being added hos slo 
wos 
Considerably. In fact, toto! capacity in 1984, which 
ced 
be 45717 MW according to the Schedule of 1979, was redu ording to the schedule of 1983(18), 
Because of Brazil's balance of n payments problems and rising inflatio rate, th 
to borrow heavily from international 
Onks while the average tariff rate has tended to decline in real 
© combination of rising interest rates (both internationally ond 
“omestically), excess fapacity of generating electricity) and falling 
8 electricity Sector has had 
Commercial b 
terms!!9). tp, 
Prices for elect 
ce 
ricity have meant that the electricity sector has had to fa quite Serious qj ficulties to finance its investment programme. However, 
6 
if the nuclear Programme is left aside, then, although th Investment programme tn hudroelectricity was undoubtedly very ambitious, had it not been 
» Consumption of electri City would not have been very far from the Projections made2!)_ To the extent that the recession could not possibly 
-33- 
for t be the basis have been predicted in the mid-70's, then it we e ond which were mi Condemning the investment decisions taken at ee in Brazil in the designed to increase the copacity of generating elec 
early and mid-1980's. 
the production of hydroelectricity in 
Rise) in ae both in 
In point of fact, the 
ontributions 
Brazil hown before, has brought in vital economic c orts ond import 
Faz , ass 
, 
ting exp directly substituting for imported oi! and in promo fate of the sector 
j ial di i tor. The financia : Blanes 
Substitution in the industrial sec economic pro 
ore, by and large, a reflection of the country not to overprotect the 
re, b  an ge, 
ate 
nerhene somewhat magnified by the tendency of the = raeatienets 
f the adjus 
: j beer the bulk 0 of interest 
Mvate sector in Brazil and to 
the rate 
B to the future, the question lies on the level of As to the future, 
1 ith high capita ity. Wi h h 
f growth of the demand for electricity 




i ts, lengthy periods of construction, 
very requiremen s, len 
on fe expecta! 
1 over 
er the ctor. The long 
interest rates and load 
fa } 
ore very sensitive to both i 
ns the sn st rates remal 
ill become. -electricity will be 
= ee a are on attempt to estimate ow j the figures be To illustrate this point 
- es ins itivity to chang J the cost of electricity in Brazil and its sens! y main parts: 
pital costs. 
ome Key 
into three . endown into Parameters. The cost of electricity can be brok jation and (iii) co (1) operating and maintenance costs, (ii) deprec 




(ii) depreciation Oto 12%): 16.47 to 18.84 (iii) capital costs (rate of return: 1 TOTAL 39,73 to 42.10 
ts: (1) operating and maintenance cos
-34- 
Note that cepitel costs (including depreciation) represent over SO® of 
the tote! cost, and for this reason, the latter is very sensitive to the rate of 
return epplied to ‘compute the capital costs. The average toriff rate for 
electricity in Brezit in 1982 wes US$ 42.87 per MWh which leaves 6 margin 
of between 2% end 8% above total costs, 
However, capital costs Can increose quite dramatically os interest 
rate rises, construction delays and the Iced fector falls. If the cost of a 
power plant is estimated to be US$ 800 per KW, and thet this cost is spread 
equally over the period of Construction, the figures below show how the 
total. cost, including interests during construction, will very with the period of construction end interest rates: 
Total cost at the end of construction (US$/KW) 
interestrate 10% ~ = 12% 
Bericd of Constr. : 
6 years 1144 1230 
10 years 1275 1404 
——I2yeors_"__ 14261609 
Assuming that 9 hydroelectricity power plant hes 40 years of life, the 
Capital costs of Generating electricity of a power plant which costs US$ 
1200 par kw (plent §) or US$ 1500 per Kw (plant 11) can be computed for different toad fectors and discount rates(23). 
 
costs in US$/MWh 
—Dlant | plant I 
load fector 
60% 2335 27.69 29.16 3462 
508 28.02 33.23 35.02 41.54 © 




then ating electricity cen more Note that the capita! costs of sare ebove. re . double between the two extreme ecenerios conside 
(42) Transportation ond Communications hasis evey from road 
In view of the I! NDP objective of shifting emp the results: echieved 2, transportation and towards transport by rail a nDe strategy. Cen be considered among the moin failures of the tupe of transportation in 




nts for Cen be seen that highway transportation eccou vi on oped trend until 
on MFansort of passengers and, 
nu a the two most densely 
ae meuguretion of undergrovne 
ne "entre coupled with © 
Populated towns in Brazil (S80 Paulo end Alo de resvansporttion (i 
Slowdown in the rote ‘of growth of passenge sea inthe shore of 
incres 
Possengers-Km) have helped to prevent yet further 
away ent resources 
Therefore, although the reallecotion of investm 
eys wos 
from rood trensportetion and towards ratiwey 
quite successful
, 88 
d to the not corespon 
1 
Seen in section (2.2)
, the actual results di
d 
tee! 
ag the totel foilure 
of the ‘S 
Horizonte to Sé0 
Construction beg
an on 
Paulo carrying 50 million tonnes
 of iron end vl ren
 i 100 
April, 30M 1975 and
 according to the eut
horit - _ Soe
 rea to 
days. By the end of 1
982, the project hed 
been mr eat
 tmel 
319 km, of which the f
olowing hed been comple
ten: 
One of the main reasons for that ¥ a to tine Bel0 
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S98 of the total), 26.6 Km of bridges end flyovers (or 97% of the total) end 
142.7 million of m? of earthworking (or 98% of the total", work on the 
superstructure was schedule to begin in 1963. In July of thot year 
construction wes interrupted, end by then, it had consumed ebout US$2.2 
biltion{2), 
The main adverse implication of foiling to increase the share 
railway sector in total transportation in Brazil refers to the consumption of 
diesel which, in recent years, hes ‘been the determinent of the consumption 
Of crude oil in Brazil. Indeed, table (4.2.3) brings out quite clearly the sharp 
rise in the share of diesel in the toto! consumption of energy by the 
of the 
hi 
* trensport sector unti! 1980, while the share of electricity remained roug y 
Constant between 1973 and 1979, rising slightly thereafter. Not
e, however, 
that the shares of diesel in the consumption of energy in both the railway 
Sector and in shipping hove tended to fall in recent years, 
08 shown in teble 
(42.4) tn the former, steam coal end electricity heve 
been importent 
Substitutes, whereas in the latter fuel of! has partly replaced diesel. 
Therefore, the sharp rise in the shore of diesel hes been partly due to 
trensport. 
tha maintenance of a high shore of roed transportation 
in total P 
n the consumption 
da pert 
Of energy in road trensporteticn, see tebdle(4.2.4), 
hes also a , i 
ese 
TWo main reasons may account for this rise in the consumption 
of di 
tion of @ rad transportotion. Firstly, it is likely to have been a reflec 
ses for the 
‘eduction in the use of automobiles os compared to the use of bu 
from 4 
transport of passengers. This is undoubtedly 
a welcome chenge 
e use of 
energy saving viewpoint. Secondly, it reflects an increase in n 
es. The diesel tuetied torries es compered to gasoline or alcohol fuelled mn of on ®vidence shown in teble (4.2.5) suggests that, although the ee tion ic . 
NeW. gasoline end alcoho! fuelled lorries has been higher than the 
produ 






































































































































































































































































































































































Gctually increased, probably due to the retirement of gesoline 
fuelled 
lorries. 
The increose in diesel fuelled lorries ts likel 
the increase in the use of heavier lorries which took 
Shown in toble (4.2.6). To the extent that heavier lorries 
are more efficient, 
. n the road transport 
y to be correloted with 
place in this period 6s 
this Chenge again represents a positive move withi 
System. In point of fact, teble (4.2.7) 
suggests that t 
improvement in the efficiency of diesel consumption in 
here has been s
ome 
road transportation, 
Particularly in the transport of passengers. 
Improved efficiency could also be regarded 
5 ° miti 
‘the otherwise poor results from the 
investments in the 
1974, the reilwoy 
(©), Therefore, © 
period was 
As oresult, 
gating factor in 
railway sector. 
After having been negleted for so meny years before 
System in Brazil was obs
olete and very snefficien 
Substantial part 
of the investments 
made in the 1974/82 
designed to modernise 
and improve the 
efficiency of the 
system. 
the Energy productivity in the railway system 48
 measured by th 
SHS of traffic 
per tonne of fuel 








he 11 NDP refe










- from 114 in 1973 to 140 in 1979 and to 1541 e mode 
Going back to road transportation 
© b 
About the consumption of alcohol (etha
nol P 
Cone) as a fuel in Brazil. As mentioned befor
e t 
“ Stimulating the use of alcoh
ol (anhydrous etl 
In 1975 this policy became @ programme, th
e Nat 
; anol t 
Proaicool - designed to increase the 
production of anhydrous eth 
ows that in 
Used mixed with gasoline as 0 fuel for vehicules. Table (42.4) sh 
Tact the share of alcohol in the consumption of energy | 
Pose very sharply between 1976 and 1979 
contributin 
n road trensportation 
g to the fall in the 
8 ‘ hare of gasoline consumption. rter the second ofl 
e 
However, it was only in the post-ll NDP period or ©
Table (425): Production and Fleet of 
(in unities) 
Year Production of Lorries 
-37a- 
Lorries by type of Fusl 
Fleet of Lorries Gasoline Alcohol Diesel Gasoline & 
i Alcohol 1976 cs 0 224245 1977 = 0 a 268943 1976 1333 0 84936 294009 1979 2634 10 90407 248270 1980 3934 ~ 14 98069 226589 1981 - 5653 2157 68540 201264 1962 628 904 45311 ie 
Source: Anudrio Estatistico dos Transportes 
Table (4.2.6): Fleet of Lorrias by Weigh (in percentages) 
Year Light&medium semi-heavy heavy very heavy 
1976 85 . 8g 75 11 1977 813 10.1 65 0.1 1976 60.1 11.2 8.4 0.2 1979 76.6 12.6 a5 0.4 1980 76.9 13.9 8.4 0.8 1981 75.8 14.9 8.6 0.7 
Source: Anuario Estatistico dos Transportes 
Tabie (4.2.7): Consumption of Diesal in Road Transportation Per unit of load (tonnes-km) and Passangers-km transported 
(1976=100,0) Year load 
Passangers 
1976 100.0 
100.0 1977 98.2 
949 1978 98.2 
89.7 1979 98.1 
63.7 1980 $9.1 
79.7 1981 98.6 
749 1982 99.0 
75.1 
Sources: Balenco Energético Nacional and Anudrio Estatistico dos Transportes 
































e a si 
US$0.201 per litre in the same yeor. 
= 38 ad 
in shock in 1979 that the alcohol programme 
on litres 48 the government set a target of 10.7 billl ctually produced in 
litres © Year of 1985/86 compored to 2.4 billion 
ment of s total replace 1978/79. Furthermore, hydrous ethanol, which allow 
wered cors. Toble 
tion of energy in 
year of 1984/85 
5/a6 ond almost 
| po §esoline, begon being produced to fuel new pure ie 
(4.2.4) shows that the share of elcohol in a the crop 
road transportation jumped to 17.2% in 1983. vf ie 
ethanol ‘production reached 85% of the target $ 
i ol fuelled eng 908 of new cars sold in Brazil had pure alcoh 
; duction 4n ssive pro se viebility of the 
is controversy 
assessing the 
ects on the 
nes. 
tion d consump 
However, despite the impre “avceanenen 
Performance of ethanol in Brazil, the socio  ediereiel 
Slcoho! programme has been o matter of gree 
in thot exist 'S partly due to the enormous difficulties 
eff 
omplexity of its ec mpted to Programme viability in view of th ave ottemp : 
j h dies that 
-benefit stu








‘ et *Ssess the programme viability have com a 
m The most recent attempt”) ines re of gasoline equivel 
§M S80 Paulo to be equal to US$0.285 per Hit {90 t price © ot marke December 1984 prices)®). The international SP litre in 0.26 per ual to US$ , Plus en allowance for freight costs wos eq gesoline in Brazil en 
f ity cost 0 cost of 1981, Taking this price os the opportun!'y saguavente social AX 





ce (CIF) of 
gasoline 
e of gasoline 
fell to 
i that the 
Programme would seem assured ees oe 
e 8280line did not fell. Nevertheless, t ric "5 export Pp | in the Cropped to Us$o.23 in 1983 and Brezil gnificant fol 
ity of the viabili 
m ssory for ®stimated social cost of ethanol would see nee Oted socia
-39- 
the alcohol Programme in Brazil at Current international gasoline prices. 
Two major objections can be made about the above analysis. Firstly, | 
the figures estimated for the social cost of ethanol in Brazil are debatable on the grounds of date and methodology applied!), Secondly 
that 
the assumption 
e the international Price or Brozil's export price of g asoline may be 
regard garded as the Opportunity cost of gasoline in Brazil can also de uesti (11) questioned’'"”. The quontity of gosoline traded internationally is marginal Compered to tote! world production!!2) if exports of gas excess supply in domestic markets, gasoline surplus may b reel : sidual from Oi] refining and thus be exported at ‘marginal’ it moy well be that the international 
‘marginal’ 
oline represent 
@ regarded as a 
cost. Therefore, 
rather than ‘actual’ cost(t3) M A clad 
Several oi! derivatives that are j im : a paeNNa Se ONSET 
proportion of O79 inevitably produced by oil refining, the Of crude oil ond refining costs that is allocated to gasoline Cannot be dete rmined without reference to domestic demand conditions and 
the oi] import bil), 
Therefore, n » Neither the international Price nor Brazil's export price of 
9asoline can b e the basis for &88essing the viability of the alcohol 
- Sources: Anuério Estatistico dos Tronsportes end Anuart 
-40- 
programme in Brozil. So long es uncertainties con
cerning the evolution of 
reletive prices and some of the difficulties mentioned above rema
in, it Is 
extremely unlikely that the controversy which surrounds the alcohol 
-be! t 
Programme in Brazil con be settled within the framework of 
cost benefi 
Iso 
analysis. The use of sugar cane ethonol as ¢ fuel in other countries moy 0 
; “Proalcool’ in Brazil. dramatically change the parameters for assessing the 
r from t fo As for as shipping is concerned, 1! NDP projections were det 
j and 
the actual results. The figures below show both the I! NDP projections 
results for the capacity of the Brazilian merchant fleet. 
- Yeor 1979 1979 
1982 
7 é esulls 
Capacity in DWT IWNDP Projections “Result
s A im 
? 
long-range navigation 8079 5907 
ee 
Coastal shipping 067 1072 ee 
inland waterways shipping 392 344 Aa 
Ol] tankers "2280 2665 
total a 9438 7223 9385 
o Estatistico do 
Brazil 
Table (4.2.8) shows that the porticipation of 
total long-range shipping (in tonnes of cergo) increas 1976/1981 
total cargo exported and in the total cargo imported in 
the sits 
Period. However, due to a sharp 
fall in the imported tonnage, in 
whi ‘a 
Brazilian f lag has a very high share, the total 
participation of the Brazil 
Tlog fell in 1981. 
t 
T 
vestments in communica 
tetera 
NDP targets. Telephone 
the Brazilian fleg 
in 
ed slightly in both 
the 
jons can be consi
dered 
Quite satisfactory when compored to the i 
by 1979. It Switchings were projected to increase to 123 thousand trunks by i
Sctually rose to 124.5 thousand
. International yoice channels were
 proj
-4]- 
to reach 1404 in 1979 ; 
ia gas aa, (444 via satellite end 960 vie submari 
voice channels reached 1336, of wh omen , of which 676 were vie 
satellite and 46 0 vie submerine cable. The domestic tel ex network was 
Planned to ris e@ to 22 thousand installed terminals. In act i ctuality, it rose to 
38.3 thousa nd installed terminals. The number of-telephones was estimoted 
to increase to 8.1 milli Q ee ere n in 1979. In this year, it reached 
6.4 mill 
as 8.4 million. The intro-stete 
toll ci ion, but 
circuits were 
Projected to in crease t 0115 thousand in 1979. It rose t 13 } 0 138 thousand!5) 
-42- 
(S)current Account_of Brozil's Balance of Payments 
ond Brazil's 
ort Perf n orkets 
d export drive 
on deals with 
In previous sections, the import 
substitution process on 
in anu mber of individual industries 
were examined. This secti 
tructures ond on 
the ef fects of these changes on Brazil's 
export ond import $ 
performance of 
Brazil's trade balance on goods and commercial 
services. The 
Brazit's exports as compored to 
that of other countries 
and groups of 
C ountries is also discussed here. 
following points: 
The main aim of this sectio
n is to emphasise the 
ted on imports 
of 




ediate ond capite! goods, with v
ery little foreign exchange being 
Spent o 4 nm consumer durab
les. A rapid imp
ort substitution 
process in the 
interm edtate and capital goods 
industries is also clear 
from the chenges in 
B ‘ rezil's import structure; 
(b) The structure of B
razil's exports hes che
nged drameticelly es 
®xport 
. 
$ of manufactures, espe
cially capital goods, 
ropidiy increased their 
she re in the value of exports from Brozil; 
(c) The transfer of rea
l resources t0 Brozil, 







f the world in t
he three 
a " goods and co
mmercial services, hos 
d 
Flee. ni into la
rge and negative tronsf
e 
real resources from Brazi
l to the rest 0 
Years from 1980 to 1982 w
as equivalent to more then 
60 percent of the real 
transt er of resources to Brazil 
in the six yeors period from 
1974 to 1979. In 
Other 
words, in the lost three 
years of the series Brozil 
has transferred reo! 
resourc es abroad at en average 
per yeor 93 percent 
greater then the ennual 
vero ge inflow of real resources 





s o measure of 
the str enuous adjustment which prozil 
unde 1960, but only 
mede 
possi ble by the significant structural 
adjust
-43- 
(d) There is clear evidence that the level of consumption was allowed 
to expend at excessively high rates of growth in the 1973/79 period and, in 
Porticular, in 1974 ond 1976. A more moderate rise in consumption could 
have reduced the trade deficits ond thus relieve somewhat the subsequent 
burden of the foreign debt. However, the very geod performnunes of Brazil's 
exporis os compared to that of other countries suggests thot world demond 
was ot least as an importent constraint on the rate of growth of Brazil's 
exports as was the expansion of consumption in Brazil in the 1974/79 
period; 
(e) disaggregation of Brazil's exports reveals that the penetration of 
Brazilion manufectures, especially machines ond equipment, in world 
markets have indeed been very impressive. Exports of non-manufactures 
from Broezil have also Performed well when relative prices and wheater 
effects are taken into account. 
Table (5.1) brings out the changes in the composition of imports and 
exports in Brezil in the 1973/82 period, Note that the shore of fuels 
(basically petroleum) underwent a phenomenal rise, accounting for more than half of total imports in 1962. The sheres of ol! other import categories we sharply fallen since 1974/75 (except for food items in 1978/82) Bearing in mind that imports hove been compressed relatively to GDP sin , 1974/75"), this change in the composition of im c significant import Substitution that has taken 
capital goods industries. 
ports reflects the very
place in the intermediate and 
As to the Composition of exports, o steep rise in the share of manufactures, especially of machinery and equipment, is one of the most noticeable change. This rise was lergely at the expense of a fall in the share of food items and agricultural raw materials (most of these goods are Classifi a ed as consumer non~durable goods) while the shore of consumer 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table (5.2) gives the trade bal services Snces on goods and commercial s ot 1970 prices in the 1970-1982 
e trade Period. It con be seen thot th 
ed into ily and turn 
deficit, ofter Feaching a peak in 1974, declined ae ratio of imports 
sizeable SUrPluses in the last three Years of the series, ; 
to GDP in the same tab 
4 and ‘ ntil 197 
le shows an identical patter, rising u 
falling thereafter. 
The ratio Of exports to GDP in the 1974- Slightly below the ay 
1975). This fact wout 
high in this Period. In 
ond 1976 When dome: 
table (5 
stay 1979 period tended to - 
970-73 period (except 
ion was too tion was 
d seem to Suggest that domestic absorp deed, this Would seem to p 
rage observeq “in the 1 




Stic absorption graw 9.4% and 12.08, respe 
3). It shoul 4d also be Stressed that 
Consumpt 
onsistentty higher than t 99@sting that ® somewhat mo 
ion wag c 
Qoin sy 
been exercised, 
9 76/7 hat of GDP in the 19 Period, 9 
ye : Id ha re cautious policy cou 
the last Column in 
in tote €xports by Prices jn the 1974/79 Period was c Period. Therefore, this Would Sugges important Constraint On the leve] Sbsorption in Brezil, In other Words Mid-1979'. Would not have been nee 
of 
However, 
toble (5.2) reveals that the ei 
Brazil's export 
developing 
countries at oe 970/73 onsistentiy 
higher than in the tas an t thot wortg demand wes at nena °f Brezil's exports as was do in the 8 fall in domestic Ee 
rise 
essarily matched by an equiva fa have had to face increasing comp 
in ExDorts as Brazilian 900ds wourg obroag, 
) and to the 
Both the Fatios of exports to GDP (at constant 
ete 
Yolume of Exports by q 
Hy in matica 
e¥eloping Countries increased quite: dre 
the 19605. Although iti Markets in Brazil have ¢ investments Made jn the 
th of rove 
. the real rote of 9 
-44a- 
d ervices am mmercial 5 Table (5.2); Trade Balance on goods & co 
ts 4 Impor' Selected ratios of Exports an 
ils Ratio of Brazi Imports: 
exporL ea Balance Exports SN 
ot 
Te ees cons oneneDe 
ra Tas) 
Exports 
of iperts ‘Com. Goods 
ail 
: 
in %) en 
1970 
Year Pan & Com. Goods * Services 
‘ prices-in
inte fal 































emai a 73 
9.0 
7.76 























1977 251875 S000 MS 












1980 352046 eee se 
1981 eo, | 1982 38782, 
evel. is
tics,U4*- 
a & D St
ati N
 
trad k of Intern 
+ and Handboo! -FGV,1984; a ionais do Brasil, IBRE-FG' SOURCES: Contas Naci 
tages) in percen iablas (in pi cro-varia 
Rates of Selected Ma | Growth 
Table (5.3): Real Annua 




He 92 i 12.0 08 
25 
1974/73 9.7 40 125 -06 





1977/76 5.7 45 Bt ya 0} 
1978/77 5.0 
63 
3A ) “08 0) 
1979/78 6.4 
5.6 -14 if -4) 
1980/79 72 -42 32(1 
1981/80 e : 
15 1982/81 
* 
hanges- tock ¢ luding 5 2 (2) exc 1984. 
Pe. ing stock changes: RE/FGV, 
sue eat do Brasil. 16 wae (in &) stig Countries (in 
javelo ports D om both é to axports ara 
ie y 
Table (5.4). Ratios of Brazil's exports (onc an ananutectur® — 1 Manufactures 
on Tota 1.86 
66 

















siTc (5) to S ol (2}+cal.(3). 
1979 5.39 
3.58 
5 Massified (rom thus col.(1)¢ 
1989 
9.32 
A ne those Cl ing ctries-. 5 ar 
velop! 
1981 
a of manufacture 
de 
Notes: (1) Brazil's expor 
rom Geng is total exports f Jepment Sta 
ratios 
Minator in all threa tistics. U.N.. & Dove 2 Trada Surces: Handbook of International
-45- 
to this SUCCeSs, since they were responsible for the large expansion in the Capecity of production of manufactures 
intermediate gcods, which in fact turned out to be the fastest growing 
fez 
2 Brezilion exports{2). They must also account for the diversification and Competitiveness of Brazilian goods, 
In tab} 
iE 
e (5.6) Brazil's exports of iron & steel and of non-ferrous 
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groups of countries. Note 
Brazil has been 
ave been 4 
1 in 
metals ore compared to these exports by the same 
thot the relative performance of these exports from 
generally very, good, though again 1976 does not 
seem toh ae 
Porticularly good year. Indeed, exports of 





rts from developing coun 
‘ast m
ei 
same exports from 1981) and have grown at a much faster pace then ue 
ALADI countries or from countries in the South end South- in exp Shares of exports of non-ferrous metals in world exports or : starting 
developing countries have increased even more repidly, a 
East Asia. Brazil's 
arts from 
from 
o smaller base. 
The ratios of Brazil's exports of non-menufecty 
fuels) to the same exports from developing countries © F 
(5.2). At current prices, the performence of a Fs 
nhon-manufactures has 
been generally good, though in 19? : a 
1980, the shares of Brezil’s exports of na en 
fuels) were below the 1973 level. Note, nena” re yig-a-vis the 




re shown in tabl
e 
s exports of 
6, 1979 and 
mineral 
ns in 
larg beans exports the b 1 olume of coffee 
peor os hiseg anil e columns on the right h 
the poor performance in 1978 and 1979 - se 
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exchange constraint on the overall TeV d, the price of 
ib! 
that they became economically unfeasib i and, on the 
ables) and the fi 
nd fell. Other inv 
be carried out 
en planned 
on the as 
use 
inputs (especially of import 
other hand, expected future dema
 
of technical indivisibility hed 
t° 
projected capacities, 
though they had be 
Much faster growing demand. 
The aim of sustaining 
th 




with their originally 
sumption of 8 
eS eR ee ee eS 
to level as high
 6s 10% in 
f growth 9




(6) Pros ond Cons of the I! NDP Strategy 
n 
a 2 £ 
= 5 both 0 negative 
2 : cf In retrospect, 
it can be said that the II NDP presented 
3 SeBkrreecaa- Bese _ 
SN  aR aNgS Be > ond a positive side. 11 NOP strategy wes 00 
28 BSs the eg Sse a t con be said that 
c =e 
n the negative side, it co net és ek g concerned (perhaps somevt 
25 ms ambitious as for as economic growth was iracle) becouse: (i) it 
38 223 . nomic mirec 
§3 & 33 blinded by the euphoria of the eco the fect that. there were 
g55 ‘ ‘eri 5 related to ae 
3 aeeectentel 
he eT my hed reached full utilization of 
POreseseneee 8 shor inputs, the econo Hit N2NRRaSSSx g & tages of essential inp | scatingtonnet sectors, ond ( ) 
5 aly 




eR orMMreansn é unrealistically counted on very fe 
PRRRPOBSRSHS F economy. nie than enticipated by the 
5 s favoure 
2 2 As reality proved to be much 1° t plans hed to adjust to more 
SESRE 3 ; investmen ‘ 
2 =e 5 a 8 SUH LkRR= = , INDE), both economic growth and in main adverse implication of the 
2 Heute eres-u¥ o | 
ig the e 
se RL tomie DORSET. HineRE mE - this odjustment process hod. almost 
= ambitious targets set by the II NOP, of investment resources on set yawna-ay = . location , 
esiarase =< gs 5 inevitably to generate some misal 4. This was the consequence of the 
E hence much higher costs than anticipated. roving being initiated, had to 
ter —_ 
5 fact that some investment projects, Ph doned due to the foreign 
ROS Shexsacen g : ted or even oban fact 


























































































































































































































significantly contributed to some speculative and unnecessary importation 
in that yeor. 
On the positive side, it can be said that the 11 NDP correctly refused 
to adopt o strategy thot would drastically reduce economic growth or plunge 
the country into a recession, as most advanced economies did following the 
first oi! shock. Equally important was the determination to sustain and even 
increase the share of investment in total income rather than spend foreign 
resources in wasteful consumption. : 
The determination to advance the industrializetion process in Brazil 
by implementing an import substitution programme in energy resources and 
by expanding the capacity of production of the capital and intermediate 
goods sector at a foster rate then that of the consumer goods sector (in 
; order to correct what was rightly seen as an unbalanced economic growth), 
including the expansion and installation of new industrial branches in areas 
such as eletronics, mechanical engineering, metallurgy, shipbuilding, 
roilwoy equipment, aircraft manufacturing, petrochemicals ond 
pharmaceuticals must also be counted 4S positive factors brou ght about by 
-the I NDP. 
Moreover, it would be reasonable to assume that the learning by doing 





(1) “It is necessary a change in the relative priority 
: er to re 
economic sectors and within industry in ord 
iven to diff erent 
duce imports and 
raise exports”, II NDP, p.19; 
(2) Compos (1983); 
(3) Jornal do Brasil, 01.04.1984; . 
(4) The state penetration in productive investm 
causes 0 
particularly attacked as one of the chief 
ent arees hes 
been 
{ Brazil's economic 
problems; 
(5) The Times, 26.06.1984; 
Section (1) 
(1) The objective of this brief review fs simp 
analysis of the post-1973 period. a 
Period may be found in Bache (1977) 
and ra 
(2) Cormpound annual rates unless otherw! 
Necionois (Conjuntura Economice, December 
Bonelli and Werneck (1978). See Suzigen ¢t 
ly to set the 














pursued in this period; 
1977); 
(3) See Bache (1977) and Malan end Bonelli 
¢ cae yee 










(5) Maten (1981) has emphasised this poin 
clear the pecul
ieriety of today is relatively nt of the chenges in the 
in lig 
seen ino historical perspective end 
* 48; economic conditions”, Ibid, P-! ~ 
no 




he share of Br
az!
-50- 
ex ports in world imports (at 1970 Prices) underwent 9 marked increase 
int his period, from 0.86% in 1967 to 1.062 in 1973, it still remained. 
He below its level in the 1950's and early 1960's when it varied from 
ae Sec” ee between 1953 and 1961. This point 
Pay, een sufficiently stressed in the literature; 
re thourough analysis of the Brazilian export performance in 
this periad see Doellinger et al. (1973) and (1974); 
(8) See Malan (1981), p.154- 
, 
_ growth-rat &s Of 16.5% in 1970, 32.68 in 1971 and 19.1% in 1972 we not only unprecedent but by for the Ia 
5 
ee IFS-INE), Tgest annual increases since 1951 
in this period (20 48 on average 
per annum between 
32.5% per annum between 1971] and | ea 
{12) See Wells (1973) and Pereira (197 
foreign debt in this Period; 
973, based on SDRA’s). See IFS-IMF; 
4) for an account of this rise in the 
(13) That does not mean to say that domestic 
this period. policies had no importance in 
17.13% and 22.68, respectively; 
(15) See tables in Sections (3) and (4): 
-51- 
es; 
(16) Bonelli ond Werneck (1978) end 
Conjuntura Econémico, several issu 
(1?) Doeltinger et al. (1977). 
Section (2) 
Section (2.1): 
(1) II NDP, p.21 (original in Portuguese); 
{2) Ibid, p.25; 
(3) Abreu and Malen (October 1974). Th 
plan itself 
rather tho 
did not have the 
orld economy 





meons that they were criticising the 
s the plan mokers, 
Amplementation of it, thus they, ® 
knowing how the yf 
advantege that we n
ow have of 
actually developed; 
(4) Ibid, p.2, 4 
ond 9; 








(8) GDP of all 
countries at co
nstant price ros




ar in the sam
e period 
~ Se€ IFS/IMF; 








t 25.5% in 
pp of the 
industrial 
(compound rate) in 
the 1 
countries rose 2.
7% per Ye 
(9) Weighted average at cons 
¢ savings based ° 
ges of 












instead, the figures © 
in 1974/79. Note tho 
t 
1974/75, despite 
the deterioration of 
i 
77 - s€ 
5.0% n 1974/ 
i. 




estic sovings © 
dramatic fall
 in the te 
rate peoked
 6 
5 of trade in t
his period, 
nomice, June 
and was equal to 2 
1984, This suggest 
ond foreign savings 







rms of trade, 
“seen as the combined result of th
-52- 
the sharp rise in the Edie capaity interest rate on-the foreign debt and th 
re 
e increase 
(10) Acco rding to Furtado’ ado’s ex-post analysis of the period od, the I! NDP 
stretegic obj ectives - to fill the gaps of the indust ustrial sector b y 
co i 
* 
ne e of ~- were sely IT H Ye r - HOoweve he ’ 
Pointed out th at in order to achieve those objectiv es, it would ha ve 
been necessa Ssary to take m easures to reduce the shere of c onsumption in 
( t im c to pe] t f Cc t 
rise in the j 
Brazilian model of d 
t rote. This would ha
ve meant modif 
durable goods 
evelopment based
 on the expansion




















of the economy in thi C
tural change con be obs
erved in th Denil 
is period and 
€ supply sid 
stable whi 
nd that the r
at ; 
a 
le the dome 
e of investm 
stic savi 
ent remain 














but was mainly 










Furtado (1982 “A ) p.43 to 56 and (1982 
Ory policy. See 
-B) p.34 to 38. 
Section (2.2): 
(1) Note that despite 
. 
MCenEAEH bi rads 
that the date on the actu
al j 
ond, hence, are an 
oo industry 
ere besed on a sem 
oe 
sortie this ee
e of the 
totel mats e of f
irms 
difference. Furthermore 
n could not possibly accou
nt fo LL 
» the shore of investment i ie a e basic 
*-53- 
from 
; roughly 562 in 
1970/74 to 852 in 1975/79. 
It, in fact, reached 
0% on average in 1975/79; 
2 ) The share of investment in ports end oi 
so : me. Other infra-structure
 investments i 
(undertaken by Petrob
rés) and 
y Metro-SP and Metro-
Aio); 










ur celculations) investment in pipelines 
in the underground systems (undertaken b 
(3) Parti rlicularly of oil and electricity. 
The |] NDP also men 




xpanding the use of coe!
 in indust 
nd the develo
pment of the 
a Icohol to be mixed with gasoline © 
Programme; 
(4) 0 aetl NDP, p.2?, and from 
p.74 to p.?6; 
E ; 
. 
ven allowing for the foct 
that our estima 
industry are underestimated; 
tes for inve
stment in 





 snares of 
the aerospace
 
(6) F : 
; urther diseggregat
ion would sho 
the automobile indu









in . 2 vestments in railway equipmen 
nvestments in 
in dustry tended to rise. Within 
ch 
‘intermediate 
oil i : refining declined whereas 
micals 
ents in cellulose 
74 ond 197
9. 













5 urveys of FIBGE from 1974 
to 1979. 
Section (2.3): 
(1) In fact, exports’ 
of goods reached 
US$ 15.2 piltion in 
1979, which 
74/79 period, 
corresponds to a comp
ound annual rote of 1
3.9% in the 19 
(2) 1 NDP, p.67; 
(3 ) In fact, the accumulated cu 
US$ 40 billion; 
rrent accoun




(4) Abreu Q 
(5) IL NDP, Sa (October
 1974), p.t1. 
(6) ibid, p.18; 
(7) Ibid, p.19. 
(8) Ibid, p.121; 
(9) In fect , this ratio 
1978, risin reached 22.3% in 1974,
 fell belo 
(10) The rati 9 9gein ab
ove 20% in 1979 and 
¥ 203 from 1975 to 





S4in 1979; Ao exports rose f
rom 0.99 in 1973 to 
a 1) Intern 
. ational re 
33% of imports i es 
fell sharply from 1048
 of im 
n 19? 
port 
i 5, Pose to 848 in 1978, failin




(1.11 NOP, p.26; 
(2) Ibid, p.42: ; 
(3) Ibid, p.4o: 




’ (6) Ibid, p.45 
(8) Rei ) Reichstul and Coutinho (1961). 
(9) Lessa ( 1978): 
expansion inB rezil. See fro 
mp.129 to 173 
? t 
-55- 
ro om for monouvre would 
have to norrow down-The 
chonge in the 
olitical alliance 
pattern of industrielization wo
ul require @ new P 
ts uthoriterian 
among the economic groups which the 
state, despite 
, character, could not impose. Ibid, p.142
; 
1 : 
2) Ibid, from p.129 to p.159 but, portic
ulorly, p.143. 
Section (3): 
(1) The main basic input
 industries considered 1 
fertiliz 
n the plon were:
 steel , 
ers , pesticides






 for the phermaceut 
sulphur and other non-meta
llic minerals; 
(2) 11 NDP, p.6; 
Section (5.1): 
(1) Machines and equ
ipments ‘made on orde
r’ are those which ore
 specially 
turbines 
designed to fit the 








 in Sé 
y from eny 
for hydroelectric po
wer plants, furnac ries’ have 
tanks or containers, etc.. Ma
chines and equip 
standard specificatio










ow growth | 
Brazil in the eorly 
1970's, which led to a dra
stic | 
Product - see table (4
.4.2) - wa 
(storting with the Booz
 Allen Intern? 
underestimated 
the growth of the












g due to studi
es done in th




| in Brazil. The ||
 NDP 
eel in 1979, 
on the
-56- 
Other hand, were clearl| 
to 63, for the Plans f 
1964/65 and 1973. 
(2) Capaci Pacity of Production of alu 
us, Se 
iminium nw 7 261 thousand tonnes by the 
in . tonnes by the end of 1983. See 
80 Brasileira de Aluminio) 1983; 
f-suftj i Ciency in aluminium ore (bauxite) 








a NDP, p 2a. 
(2) Ibid, p25, 
{3) Ibig, ig 
5 Ba an 
984, 
Section (4.1.1). 





thousand berrels a doy and by was equ a! to 5 
0 thousand, against an average 
of 
@ Relaté latério da Gazeta Mercantil, 
expans fon of the steel industry between . 
-57- 
(4) The refining of of! produces a number of oil derivatives 
such es gas, 
LGP , gasoline, kerosene, naphathe, 
diesel, fuel-oil, and others. The 
vant : quantity of each derivativ
e per unit of crude oil 
refined depends 
basi 
osically on the type of oil (lighter 
0 
ts with respect to 
the shares of each 
r heavier) ond on techno
logy. There 
is some flexibility as well as limi 
derivati ative thet can be extracted 
from a unit of crude oil. 
Consequently, 
rivative that can 
be extracted from 
a 
j . 
f the maximum shares of each de ative, 
he relative demand fo
r each deriv 
unit of crude oi! do not match t n what 
h relative demand 
is greater the 
rude oil will be 
the main determin
ants 
that should be ref
ined (assuming tha
t 
then those derivatives for whic 
.Can be extracted from a unit of c 
of the total amount of crude oil 
y in the country); t : . 
here is spare oil refining c
apacit 
istico do Bresil) 
for the co (5) 
Series from FIBGE (Anuario 
Estat 
nsumption 
iries. See Balango 
Energetico Nacional 
0 : f crude oi! in the Brazilian refin 
2.1985 for 
1982 84 for date of 1983 ond Aelatério 
do Gazeta Mercontil 26.0 
data of 1984; 
7 See Modiano (1982) ; 
? ) A decline in the consumption 0 




{ crude ofl pe
r unit of 
Place through the use of substi
tutes end/or through @ 
u se of. crude and oil derivat
ives. Both types ° 
ie Possibilities’ seem likely 
to have been underestimated; 
Crude oil in cubic meters and GDP 
at 1970 prices, 
Section (4.1.2): 
(1) 
I NDP, page 96, Capacity incl
ud 
8 ; lotion being built in Brezil (Angre 
rst nuciear pow
er 
ed 626 MW fr
om the fi 
1) and then 
schedule to 
start 
Operation in 1977; n in the capacity of 
(2 ) The difference in capacity is 
4s Annual Repo ‘ 
mainly due to
 a revisio 
_ Self-producer
s (see Eletrobr 
rt of 1982);
-58- 
(3) See Eletrobra eet, $ Annual Reports. In foet, it is worth mentioning that the 
s Moree ile of fuel of! in the total consumption of energy at 
$0 transformation of energy (refiniries, aiscure cantres 
etc) was drasti Cally reduced fro 
; m 57.73 
in 1 ‘ 
14.8 in 
973 to 35% in 197 
1983, as the share of indigenous sources om 
bagasse ond 
refinary gas i , 1984; gas incrensed. See Balan 
such as natural gas, 
¢o Energético Nacional 
(4) It shoul d be poi 
derivatives fa ae although small, 
the shares of other oil 
es , 
from 4.4% in pi haphatha, kerosene and gas) tended to rise 
: i 05.1% in 1979 ; » fal Balanco Energético Nacional 1984. Sn nee event 
(5) The ave rage pri site Price of electricity for industrial 
n ond in Brazil are shown below. ee 
Yeor 
Great Britoin’**) Brazil"**) 
eS in US$/Mwht") 
is5 36.45 24.25 4 : 
ints 43.92 25.84 
ie 59.25 see 1 3 
(*) Quorter average 
exch 51.48 
ai 
xchange rate ; 
Sole price (Cr$/uss). 8 (US$/E) and year average exchange rates 
(**) Price Ss delivereg t 
FeEpONGILS “ta : large industrial consumers (average pric id b 




ments before the thir Survey covering some 
600 
: d qua 
; ofterwards) average of the pri Se mimetics 
(*#x) Average price M Prices published on a quarterly basis 
r ? 
Pau industria} Consumption in the CESP 0 { rea in Séo 
SOURCES: ; IFS-IMF, B » Banc 0 Central do Brasil, Department of E nergy - Energy 
(8) Including only half of the 
capecit: 
~ (13) In fact both the h
ydro potential 
-59- 
Trends - A Stetistice! Bulletin and CESP Annu
al Reports. 
(6) The shore of electricity in total consump
tion of energy rose from 4.02 in 
1973 to 14.38 in 1983 in the agricult
ural sector, and from.16.3% in 1973 
to 33.9% in 1983 in the reside
ntial sector. The shore of fire
wood fell 
from 70.4% in 1973 to 49.6% i
n 1983 in the agricultural sect
or, and from 
71.6% in 1973 to 50.9% in 198
3-in the residential sector. 
(7) A full evaluation of the inve
stments made in the electricity 
sector is 
beyond the scope of this pop
er. The analysis here should
 be regarded eso 
preliminary assessment; 
y of Itaipu hydroelectric po
wer plant 
(6300 Mw) which corresp
onds to the Brazilian par
t. See Eletrobraés 
Annual Report 1979; 
(9) Including 2.8 x 10° MW from Itaipu
. Eletrobras Annual Report 1979; 
(10) ‘Plano de Atendimen
to dos Requisitos de En
ergia Elétrica até 1990 
- 
Regides Sudeste ¢ Sul do Br
asil’ , Relotério Eletrobrés 
December 1974. 
This study is often ref
erred to as ‘Plano 90°; 
(11) See ‘Plano 90", page II-16;
 
(12) See ‘Plano 90", page HI
I-1?; 
in Brezi! end the costs of nuc
lear power 
plants were underest
imated in the study. 
In view of Brazil's ine
xperience 
and consequent uncertai
nty related to the cost 
of nucleer power station
s, 
the study consider
ed 4 number betw
een 4 end 6 nucle
ar plants cf: 1200 
MW each, as necess
ary by 1990 depen
ding upon the inclu
sion or not of 0 
25% error margin on 
top of the cost estima
tes. The cost of two
 nuclear 
plants (2x 1200 Mi
) to be installed in
 
Us$ 413 x 10° /KW (
price of Ju 
truction ond th
e initial load 0
 
f Angra 
of June of 1
974) without 
Angra in addition 
to Angra | was 
ne 1974) including 
interests 
estimated in 
f fuel. Time of 
construction 
during the cons 
| at that time 
was 
be six yeors. The
 cost 6 
¢ 456 % 10> /K
W {price 
was assumed to 
estimated in US
-60- 
interests durin ig the construction 
: and the initi 
(14) ‘Plano 90°, pages 11-6, I!-7 and V-16- 
si al 
(15) Angra | has be 
(or ? years setae ey Inougurated 
after 12 years of construction 
three times more i 2). It cost US$ 
1.8 x 10° or US$ 2875/KW (obout 
Angra Il is serach hm caren 
hydroelectric plant of 657 MW). 
of foundation works, and the complete and Angra Il! is still 
at the stage 
1980's. Nuclebras, the stat ore not schedule 
to start operation in the 
total of US$ 3.8 x 109 in fs See ee eaebrp eration; 
hoy investeilie 
890 x 109 nuclear programme up to now, of which US$ 
refer to financi ial costs. | 
on all -In fact, 
Nuclebras i sae 
the heavy equipment for Angra 
It end ebras is paying interests 
an 
Relatério q : 0 Gazeta Me ; re 
10.02.1985; antl, 
) Ill already in Brazil. See 
68.02.1985 and Jornal do Brasil 
(16) See £ 
letrobras A n 
requisitos de Energi nusl Report 1979 a
nd ‘Plano de Atendiment oElé ‘ 
September of 1979 a a
ha Pte StS 'or simpl




ote that the estimates of Sin
ees robras, 
were in fact Somewhere in b etwee 
adjusted to teke int n the estimates of hypothesis | and I! of ‘Plano 90" ii 0 account the Brazilian market ( P i : see ‘Plano 95° page 
(1?) The ratio of con sumption of electricity in MW year t “year to the total 
y q ; 
a 
3, against 43 , 43.9% in 197 
‘ ?a 
(18) Eletrobrés Annual Reports 4 
ne Om TS TE; 
(19) See table below: 
in 198 
979 and 1983; 
Farsi 
oreign loans and financing 
Year 
ta ectrn Average tariff rote for 
teats Y Sector over electricity i 










1978 | 15.0 
8.15 








(") 1982 prices, impl
icit GDP deflator 
SOURCES: Eletrobrés Set
or de Energia Elétric 
Retrospectiva 1973/1
982 
The total foreign debt of 
the electricity sector 
torio da Gazeta Mercen
til, 
o-Fontes e Usos de Recu
rses 
has been estimated to b
e 
20% of the Brazilian fo
reign debt. See Rele 
28.02.1965; 
(20) Excess capacity 
both in the sense of low 
load factor (availoble 
power 
over actual consumpt
ion) and cepacity t
hot could be aveilebl
e but whose 
installation is deliber
ately behind schedule 
because of lock of dem
and; 
ticity of consumption 
of electricity 
(21) In view of the e
xtraordinary elas 
e early 4980's, it is
 quite possible 




f electricity could 
have expanded as p
rojected if GDP 
ween 1960 and 198
3; 
had grown &s lit








and athers for g
enerating, trans
miting and 
1 as a whole (the e
nergy troded 
t included). See 'Set
or de Energia 
pectiva 1973-82’, 
Eletrobras. 




c energy in Brazi 
among electric c
ompanies in Braz
il is no 
Elétrice Fontes 
Estimates of depre 
State of Séo Paulo ¢ 
on the basis of the va 














at the end of 1 962 ond an estimation for working capital assumed to be 
assets amount ed to U 
5$605.07 per KW installed. Load factor was 52.2% * (actual fi igure in 198 
pee: 2) ond the average life 
9S assumed to be 20 
expectancy for all fixed 
US $0.93 ber MWh at tog rate Fa : ) u of interest, See CESP and E 
he final cost of Itoipu hydr 0 
estimated { n US$ 1200 
26.02.1985, Per KW. See 
‘Relatério da Gazeta Mercantil 
ears. i j y ; . Working capitol costs were equal to 
0 interest and US$1.12 per MWh at 12% 
letropaulo Annual Reports 1962; 
electri tric power plant (12600 MW) has been 
Section (4.2): 
(1) See RFFSA Annual Re 
tunnels, bridges ang 
the press 48 the main 
Ports. Th 
: Sophistication and excessive number of 
Tlyovers of 
t ae he Project have been often pointed by 
of its unfeasibility; (2) The Ti he Times June, agth 1984 




(4) Rai Portes 1973 ond 1974, 
Y 1976 and Anudrio Estatistico 
do 




diesel egy; tivity (i
n 
“quivalent): 1000 uni
ties of traffic per ton of fuel in 
114 1975 128 
1974 124 1976 1977 134 1 . inp ite: 979 140 1981 151 
ce: Anuario Estat Pet eth tas 2 
(5) The extens; atistico do Brasil.se at sive use ; S veral issues: ‘ es;
necessary for the pro 3 vlesland tor suger cane culti 6 ultivation that #8 
Cmestic as well ag exp ae Nes effects on both price and f e and o f 
effects on the indust oble crops. The Programme has al ae s also important 
input ing melisetl ustrie r, especi 
: S$ 4nd on the Capital goog ally on the 
automobile ond its 
$ industry,; 
(11) The share of Brazil's expor
t 
-63- 
(6) See for instence World Bank (1961), 
CENAL (1983), Homem de Melo and 
Pelin (1984) and Seroa da Motta (1985); 
(7) Seron da Motte (1985); 
(8) The social cost of ethanol 
in the State o 
estimated to be US$0.408
 and US$0.415 per litre 
of gasoline equivalent 
unted for 50% of total 
ethanol 
{ Golds and Pernambuco w
ere 
respectively. Sé0 Paulo, 
however, acco 
_ production in 1983,
 whereos Goidés ond 
Pernombuco were res
ponsible for 
only 6.70% and 4.90% of 
the total in the same year;
 
(9) Freight costs were estimat
ed to be US$2.5 per barrel; 
(10) The lack of accurat




in most studies; 
s of gasoline in 
the domestic produ
ction of 
983. See Balango 
Energético Nacional
 1964; 
gasoline reached 19% in 1
 
|d production in 
(12) World imports of gas




ook of world E
nergy Statistics, 
U.N.,1981; 
(13) The rise in the wor
ld oil re 
verage cost of oil ref
ining. Neverthel 
1983 while the internationa
l spot 
fining idle copacity is 
likely to have raised 
the a 
ess, the international p
rice of 
ne fell 15.9% betw
een 1979 and gosoli 
rude oil fell only 6.7% 
in the sé 




me period (average yeor pric
es). 
rket prices. This suggests 
that 
deed be below ‘actual’ cos
t (or 
the international 
price of gasoline 
Moy in 
the average co 
(14) In other word 
imports of either 0 
(15) Telebras ond Embra 
gt of refined oil); 
g, an increase in gaso
line consumption has
 to be met by 
j1 or gasoline. 
tel Annual Repo
rts. 
Section (5): rom 14.0% in 1974 to 





6.83 in 1979 ond 8.2% in 1982: 
(2) It should be r ; | 
® recalled that the investments in hydroelectricity also 
played on import 
rtant port in the e 
~ exportable sector; zn rabbnston’ ond competitiveness of the 
Section (6): 
(1) Perticut arly in Y In 1974 ond 1975 when the terms of trade deteriorated 
20.7%, world , trade 
at constant price fell 1.3% and conditions in the 
int i ernational capital markets worsened 
(1980) . considera
bly - see Batista Jr. 
Imports 
_ Dillion to uss 17 bina : nd the net foreign debt jumped 
from US$ 6 
International conditions Had the end of 1973 ond the end of 
1975. 
Period, but only to det °xperienced some improvement 
in the 1976/78 
eriorate quite dramatically from 1979 onwards; 
An overvalued 
> cruzej 
the inflatj ere uate bringing 
in import j 
Tonery fear. See Doeltin 
port restrictions sign 
Dae er 
Econémica, Jenuary 1976, ger (1977), Malan (1981) and Conjuntura 
‘Batista Jr., P. N. 




Abreu, M. de Poive end P. Molen (1974) Notes sobre 0 PND.If, mimeo. 
IPEA/INPES, October 1974, RJ; 
Bacha, E. L. (1977) ‘Issues and Ev
idence on Recent Brazilian Economi
c 
Growth’, World Development,
 vol. 5, n2 1/2, Great Britain
; 
(1960) ‘Participagéo Brasil
eira no Mercodo Finonceiro
 
Internocional: Custo @ Perfil do
 Divida Externa (1966-1979)', 
in 
Estudos Especiais IBRE - 
N° 2, FGY, A; 
) ‘Desempenho Industrial: Auge
 & 
Desoceleragéo nos Anos 
70°, in Indistria: politica 
instituicSes_@ 
desenvolvimento, W. Suzigan (ed




Campos, A. (1983) ‘Solucdes para 
a Crise Brasileira’, Diagndsticos 
APEC - 
Divide Externa Desdolarizacio
 Divide Interna Poupanca Inter
na, ne 9, 
RJ. 
CENAL (1983) ‘Proalcool - 
Avelia éo Soci 
Socio-Econémicos, Bras
ilia; 
Corréa do Lago, LA. et al. (1
979) ‘A Indastrio Brasileira d
e Bens de 
Capital Origens, Situacéo Re
cente, Perspectivas’, Estudos
 Especiats 
de Projetos’, CENAL - Estudos 
IBRE N21 IBRE/FGY, 
R.; 
! 
er et al. (1973) Tronsfor
macSo do Estruture dos Exp
orteries 
Brosileiras: 1964/70" 
Relatério de Pesquisa 
r= 14, IPEA/INPES, R/J.
; 
Doellinger et al. (19
74) ‘A Politica Bras
ileira de Comércio 
Exterior € 
geus Efeitos: 1967/73
. pelotério de Pesq
uisa me 22, IPEA/INPE
S, RuJ.; 
Doellinger at al. 
(1977) politica e 
Estrutura dag Impor
tacdes Brasileires’ 
Relatério de Pesquisa 
1 36, IPEA/INPES, R
s 
5 Elatricas Brasileires 





os de Ene 
ja Eletricé ate





2 Brasil’, Report : » Decembe 
Engenharia, Rus: r 1974, Diretoria 
de Plenejamento @ 
Eletrobré 5 Centrais. Elatricas Brosileiras (1979) Plano de Atendimento 
eguisito 5 S de Energio Elétrica até 199 ", september 1979, Au.; 
Eletrobras c entrais Elétrica c $ Brasileiras (1983) ‘Setor de Energi étrica ~ Font —tntes € Usos de Recursos Re ‘trospective 1973/1982, 
DEPF, Au.; 
FGV/Banco Mundial (1983) Poli | 
Honufeturados do Brosiy: FEV 3 dustrial xportacéo 
F urteda, C. (1982-4) °g Bresil Pés- 
Furtado, ©. (1982-5) Tilegre”', Paz e Terra, Ral. 
Paz e Terra, Au- 
‘ANov é ; © Dependéncia divide externa e monetarismo’, 
Homem de Ms lo, F. ond £ oo 
gots a A. Pelin (1984) + s Conomia Brasilej ' HUCITED, S.P an = 
Lesso, R. (1978) ‘A cote ral 4 
até ia de Des ; 
Fracesso’, unpublish envolvimento 1974/1976 - Sonho 
ed thesj . esis for Professor titular” at FEA/UFRJ, 
‘ : 
1346/1979" temacioneis do Brasil no Periodo mimeo,, F 
Malan, PS. ang FA/UFRA, Ral. A. Bonelti (1976) ‘a3 Lim 
Balonco de p ites do Possivel: Notas sobre egamentos e Indistri 
esquisn ep dustria na 
0 Id end New Developmen i 's', World Development, : Britain; Development, vol. 5, n@ 1/2, Great 
ques Exte 
NDivide MOS € Precos internos: 
Dificuldades da 
a xternn, Recessio e A uate Fetruturol 
7° 40109 (org.) et al, Paz sirurcaueud? 
Olitica de Ajuste" i 
Tosil Dient i 
Seron da Hotta, A. (1985 
-67- 
Pereira, JE.de C. (1974) Finonciamento Externo e Cre
scimento Econémico 
no Brasil:1966/73', Relatério de Pesquisa r2 27
, IPEA/INPES, AJ; 
Reichstul,H.P. and L.G. Coutinho (1981) ‘Investimento
 Estatal 1974-1980: 
Ciclo e Crise’, in Desenvolvimento Co
pitalista no Brasil Enssios sobre 
a Crise, vol. 2, Editora Brasiliense, 19
83, SP.; 
Second Nationel Development Plen - I]
 NDP (1974) ‘Segundo Pleno de 
Desenvolvimento Nacienal’, PND IL, S
eptember 1974, Brasilia, D-F.; 
) Proolcool: A Socio! Cost-Benefit Stu
dy, 
Seminar presented at The University 
College, London, England; 
. Serra, J. (1981) ‘Ciclos e Mudanc¢as
 Estruturais na Economia Brasileira 
do 
Pés-Guerra’, in in Desenvolvimento 
Capitelista no Brasil Ensaios 
sobre a Crise, vol. 1, Editora Brasiliense, 1982, SP.; 
Suzigan, W. et al. (1974) ‘Crescimento Industrial no Bros
ii incentives &
  
desempenho recente’, Relatério de Pesquisa n? 26, IPEA/IN
PES, Au; 
Wells, J. A. (1973) ‘Euro-do!lars, Foreign 
Debt and the Brazilian Boom’, - 
Working Poper n@ 13, Centre of Latin 
American Studies, University of 
Combridge, Engiand; 
rid Bank (1981) ‘Brazil, Alcoho
l and Biomess Energy’, Steff Appr
aisal 
Wo 
Report, April 1961, The world Bank, Washington 
D.C.;
